During the July 2026 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Ankara, Prime Minister Carney announced Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) as Canada’s lead supplier for 12 Type 212CD diesel-electric submarines over the Republic of Korea (ROK) to replace its Hanwhaine-Oceanclaet fleet.
Carney believes this will strengthen interaction with NATO allies and increase Canada’s naval presence in the Atlantic Ocean. Yet despite Carney’s assurances of Canadian commitment to the Indo-Pacific, it signals a quiet and significant geopolitical retreat.
By choosing Germany over the ROK, Canada fundamentally shifts its ambitions to become a major player in the Pacific to a more traditional role as a Eurocentric actor.
Getting down to brass tacks
Beyond aims to bolster NATO operations, the type of submarines Canada wants to procure has little or no connection to the Pacific Ocean.
Germany’s Type 212CD from TKMS is an electrically powered stealth submarine that uses air-independent propulsion technology to stay submerged for weeks at a time and was designed in partnership with Norway. They are tailored exclusively for the shallow, icy waters of the Atlantic and Arctic oceans and are optimized to deal with Russian underwater activity.
ROK’s KSS-III Batch II from Hanwha Ocean has a similar fleet of diesel-electric submarines, however it offers long-range operational capabilities that Arctic-optimized boats are not built for. Its defining attribute is the Vertical Launch System (VLS), which allows for long-range cruise missiles and is primarily designed for ground attack. More importantly, the ROK’s main selling point to Canada was Indo-Pacific maritime expansion.
Although both submarines meet military requirements for Canada, 212CD’s Arctic operational strengths point to Canada’s renewed focus on NATO engagements and operations against Russian forces. While factors such as timing and industrial costs may have contributed to Canada’s decision, they do not explain the strategic signal here.
This decision means that Canada will not plan to send its new submarines to counter China’s navy, especially in places like the South and East China Seas, where a sustained submarine presence is necessary to deter Chinese presence. Especially when it comes to a procurement of this size, Canada has chosen a submarine better geared for potential European conflicts, not the Pacific theater.
Undoubtedly, tripling Canada’s submarine fleet, strengthening interoperability among NATO allies and increasing Arctic naval presence is a major improvement in deterring Russian military operations. But strategic improvements in the Atlantic Ocean come at a cost in the Pacific Ocean.
Indo-Pacific Implications
The most immediate concern of this decision points to that of Canada Operation HORIZONfuture sea operations, especially with submarines. Operation HORIZON is Canada’s military plan to promote stability within the Indo-Pacific region by participating in pandomain military activities with Pacific allies.
Canada has remained steadfast in maintaining these commitments by implementing recent tactical deployments such as Exercise Valiant Shield and Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC).
However, this submarine arrangement runs directly counter to the broader goals of Operation HORIZON, enhancing military interoperability across the Indo-Pacific and supporting its anti-submarine warfare efforts. Especially as China increases its underwater submarine fleet, Canada’s ROK-designed submarines would have played an important role in deterring China.
While many say that Canada’s newly procured Type 212CD submarines or its existing submarines can simply be sent to the Indo-Pacific and solve this problem, this is simply not true. As of July 2026, Canada has only 1 operational submarine that simply cannot patrol the Pacific and Arctic coasts, and the new procurement is expected to be delivered in 2034.
And while the Type 212CD can theoretically operate in Pacific waters, the ship’s capabilities are focused on existing NATO advance infrastructure and cannot execute timely trans-Pacific transits like the ROK’s KSS-III submarines.
Forcing the Type 212CD submarines to be used in the Pacific would mean an extremely slow transit and a critical lack of missile payloads to deter China, bringing minimal strategic value to the Pacific region.
Furthermore, the working assumption that frameworks such as AUKUS or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and shipbuilding partnerships have been that the US and its allies, such as Canada, will gradually add more naval presence against China.
But Canada has made it particularly clear that it will not be a top contributor to the Pacific deterrence. This German procurement of submarines brings Canada closer to Europe and the Atlantic, but further away from Indo-Pacific issues.
The defeat of the ROK
This was a huge loss for the ROK, both economically and strategically. The ROK’s growing defense export industry has tried to woo its allies with its own naval vessels, but has been particularly unsuccessful in submarine matters.
Along with the failed Canada deal, Hanwha Ocean also failed to win the contract to build India’s Project-75I submarines. These contracts are economically essential for the ROK’s major defense exporters, such as Hanwha Ocean, as seen following Canada’s announcement that their stocks fallen by over 20%.
More importantly, the ROK’s pursuit of submarine contracts in North America and Europe can be seen as the ROK’s effort to advance broader defense cooperation. The same interaction that Carney refers to for NATO submarine forces is exactly what the ROK hopes to develop within the Indo-Pacific.
If Carney were to go with the ROK, the presence of allied submarines would reinforce a collective deterrence against China, not Russia.
Looking ahead
Canada’s Indo-Pacific engagement is sincere, but its procured submarines say otherwise. Arctic-hulled submarines are not used to patrol Pacific waters, no matter how committed Canada is.
The ROK has just learned that the Western alliance’s defense procurement circle depends on a stronger alliance infrastructure that it does not yet have. A distinct level of interoperability and political trust that NATO has built in North America and Europe is an element that the ROK simply cannot compete with.
If the Indo-Pacific countries really want to create a larger defense procurement network with their European and North American counterparts, they need a NATO-like procurement architecture that makes an Indo-Pacific partner the easy option.
Institutional support, procurement agencies, common logistics protocols, and common interoperability standards could be starting points for the ROK and its neighbors.
Daniel Han Tae Choi (daniel@pacforum.org) is a research intern at the Pacific Forum and a junior at Pomona College, where he studies economics. His research focuses on the dynamics of the US-ROK alliance, Indo-Pacific security, and great power competition.
This article first appeared in Modern Diplomacy and is reproduced here with permission of the author.
