Russia is fielding a stealthy new, missile-armed answer to Asia’s growing demand for submarines, but sanctions, loyalty and industrial realities could sink its export ambitions.
This month, Defense Security in Asia reported that Russia’s United Shipbuilding Corporation unveiled a new configuration of its Amur-1650 conventional stealth submarine equipped with vertical launch systems for BrahMos or Club-S supersonic missiles at the Fleet 2026 defense exhibition, signaling a major push to capture a larger share of the highly competitive global naval market.
Designed by the Rubin Design Bureau, the 1,765-ton non-nuclear attack submarine features an optional air-independent propulsion (AIP) system that extends its underwater endurance for up to 45 days, allowing smaller navies to deploy long-range, precision, anti-ship land attack capabilities traditionally limited by multiple nuclear weapons.
To achieve tactical surprise in coastal and sensor-saturated bluewater environments, the single-hull platform uses a variable-speed permanent magnet synchronous electric motor to halve traditional acoustic signatures while doubling the passive target detection range compared to competitive export models.
Integrating an automated combat management architecture capable of carrying a massive payload of 28 weapons, the platform enables rapid, multi-axis launches that compress the reaction time of enemy air defenses. By aggressively marketing the Amur-1650, Russia aims to carve out a larger share of Asia’s increasingly competitive submarine market. In particular, Russia may aim to compete in the South Asian and Southeast Asian submarine markets.
From South Asia, India could be Russia’s most reliable customer for its new submarine. A March 2026 report from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) mention that Russia remains India’s largest arms supplier, accounting for 48% of Russia’s total exports and 40% of India’s imports in 2021–2025.
In addition to India’s heavy dependence on Russian arms exports, its submarine fleet may be in serious need of modernization. Araudra Singh mentions in a February 2026 ITEM to the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) that the Indian Navy faces an acute undersea capability gap after the decommissioning of INS Sindhughosh in December 2025, reducing its conventional fleet to just 16 aging platforms.
Singh notes that decades of procurement paralysis have delayed the advanced Project-75I submarines until 2035, a critical moment when India’s remaining legacy fleet will reach mandatory retirement. He points out that this structural deficit severely undermines India’s regional maritime superiority and conventional sea denial capabilities.
Beyond aging submarines and procurement paralysis, he adds that Pakistan, India’s long-time rival, has purchased four Chinese-built Hangor-class submarines equipped with AIPsforcing India to acquire advanced platforms to urgently restore vital strategic deterrence.
Another incentive for India to buy Russia’s new Amur-1650 is that the two countries will co-produce the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, reducing compatibility issues between the missile and its launch platform.
However, India-Russia ties face serious challenges, as Rajorshi Roy notes in 2023 ITEM in the peer-reviewed MGIMO International Relations Review, with key obstacles including severe disruptions to shipments and uncertainty over export schedules as Russia prioritizes its domestic wartime demands in Ukraine.
Roy adds that at the same time, Western sanctions limit access to essential technology components and complicate financial transactions. He points out that India’s structural shift towards domestic defense production and supplier diversification is steadily reducing Russia’s dominant share of India’s arms imports.
Apparently, Roy mentions that Russia’s arms sales to China, along with India’s push for domestic defense production and supplier diversification, could diminish the importance of India-Russia defense ties.
India’s decision to expand its fleet of Scorpene submarines it may also signal growing confidence in French alternatives to traditional Russian suppliers.
For Southeast Asia, Evan Laksmana notes in a February 2026 REPORT for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) that regional states are increasingly seeking advanced subsurface capabilities, such as attack submarines, as part of a broader push toward anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities.
Laksmana points out that Southeast Asia’s militarily weaker states see underwater warfare assets as a vital asymmetric tool, driven by intensifying US-China competition and critical regional flashpoints such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.
He notes that regional policymakers and navies intend to use submarines to deny superior foreign powers access to waterways and vital territorial spaces, thereby increasing strategic costs for foreign militaries while ensuring geographic neutrality in potential great power conflicts.
The Southeast Asian submarine market is obviously saturated. While Russia may face stiff competition from France, Germany and South Korea for additional state submarine orders in the region, it has a significant presence in Vietnam, which operates six Kilo-class submarines. Vietnam has also signed on to purchase BrahMos missileswhich may spur it to buy Russia’s new Amur-1650 to provide a sea-based launch platform.
But as with India, Vietnam has diversified its defense suppliers beyond Russia due to various constraints. In the year 2025 ITEM in the peer-reviewed Russian Journal of Vietnamese Studies, Nghiem Tuan Hung notes that Vietnam’s heavy reliance on Russian equipment makes its supply vulnerable to Western sanctions imposed in response to the war in Ukraine.
Highlighting Vietnam’s heavy reliance on Russian equipment, he says that although Russian weapons still accounted for 60% of Vietnam’s defense purchases from 2017 to 2023, up from 80% in 2011–16, the trend points to gradual diversification.
Hung warns that Vietnam’s defense readiness could be at risk if key components or upgrades are delayed. He points out that most high-end Russian systems are not accessible for domestic technology transfer, which hinders the development of Vietnam’s defense industry.
Hung adds that Vietnam may not be able to integrate more advanced Russian equipment into its military ecosystem, leaving Vietnam dependent on military equipment inherited from the former.
He also points out that Russia’s growing rapprochement with China – as shown in the joint Russia-China naval exercises in the South China Sea – undermines Vietnam’s trust in Russia as a counterweight to China.
Even if the Amur-1650 attracts buyers, Russia’s ability to build and deliver the submarine remains an open question. As Michael Petersen pointed out in a July 2024 Chatham House REPORTRussia’s state-owned shipbuilding umbrella company, United Shipbuilding Company (USC), is crippled by years of catastrophic financial losses, prompting a desperate government takeover of its shares.
Petersen says that, coupled with tough Western technology sanctions, these debts are choking supply lines, forcing a problematic shift toward domestic engineering or foreign stoppages. He adds that labor shortages, supply chain disruptions and reliance on unreliable replacement components threaten Russia’s ability to sustain conventional submarine production.
Russia’s Amur-1650 could offer smaller navies an attractive mix of stealth firepower, durability and missiles, but export success will depend less on brochure specifications than whether Russian shipyards can deliver the submarines on time and to scale.
As sanctions, labor shortages and wartime pressures strain Russia’s naval industrial base, the real race in the global submarine market may not be over who has the most capable design, but whose industry can reliably turn promises into hulls.
