China’s accelerating missile growth is increasingly turning industrial capacity, stockpile depth and sustained precision strike capability into decisive factors in the evolving military balance over Taiwan and the wider Indo-Pacific.
This month, Bloomberg reported that China sharply accelerate missile production by 2025, citing an analysis of corporate filings that showed 81 listed Chinese firms were found to be supplying key components to the country’s missile industry, more than double the number recorded when President Xi Jinping took office in 2013.
According to Bloomberg, nearly 40% of these companies posted record revenues last year, with combined sales rising 20% to 189 billion yuan ($28 billion), even as revenue among China’s 300 largest listed firms fell overall.
Bloomberg said the increase reflected a wave of new military orders linked to China’s push to expand its missile stockpile amid rising tensions with the US, the war in Iran and concerns over Taiwan.
The report identified firms linked to China’s two main state-run missile makers, CASIC and CASC, that produce components ranging from infrared sensors and stealth clothing to fiber-optic guidance systems for cruise and ballistic missiles.
The rise underscores China’s effort to strengthen deterrence and prepare for a possible Indo-Pacific conflict, particularly over Taiwan, while also expanding the scope of China’s strike across the region, including Guam.
China’s rapid expansion of missile production, deployment and capacity is reshaping the military balance in a potential conflict in Taiwan. Despite persistent structural weaknesses in its defense industry, China appears to have significant advantages over the US in missile production speed, stockpile replenishment and industrial growth capacity.
Highlighting China’s missile buildup, US Department of Defense China Military Power Report (CMPR) Estimates for 2024 that the arsenal of the People’s Liberation Army Missile Forces (PLARF) increased by almost 50% over four years, to about 3,500 missiles.
This growth is supported by a significant increase in manufacturing and warehousing facilities, with CNN reporting in November 2025, China expanded 60% of its 136 missile-related facilities between 2020 and 2025, adding over 21 million square meters of space, identifying 99 missile production sites, of which 65 have been expanded.
On Missile Deployment, The New York Times reported in September 2025, China is expanding and dispersing missile deployments along its east coast opposite Taiwan. He reported that the missile brigades have built new, larger bases and added launch pads and facilities for mobile launchers.
The report says Chinese forces practice launching rockets from farm fields, valleys, highways and coastal outcrops near Taiwan. He notes that during wartime, commanders would place mobile missile units in caves and protected areas, then move them after firing to avoid detection.
In the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, Lyle Goldstein, in an October 2025 Defense Priorities REPORTsays China will use ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, rocket artillery, drones and air power to suppress Taiwan’s air defenses and strike radars, command and control nodes, air bases, naval facilities and logistics infrastructure.
Goldstein says Chinese strike missions could initially number in the thousands per day, while China’s industrial capacity would allow it to replenish its missile stockpile during a protracted conflict and sustain repeated strikes on Taiwanese airfields.
Looking at the effect of Chinese missile strikes on Taiwanese airfields, Kelly Grieco and Hunter Slingbaum argue in a March 2026 Stimson REPORT that Chinese missile and artillery strikes could dig out Taiwan’s runways and airstrips, stranding Taiwanese fighters for days or weeks, and potentially for months if China were to use more advanced missile systems or aerial bombardments.
Using modeling based on DF-11 and DF-15 missile strikes, they say China could keep Taiwan’s combat bases closed for more than two weeks and nearly a month if long-range artillery is added.
They also note that five successful strikes could disable all operational surfaces at Ching Chuan Kang Air Base, leaving surviving aircraft unable to take off or land, while repeated Chinese follow-up strikes could render airfields unusable during the opening phase of the conflict.
Comparing China’s missile production capacity with that of the US, a January 2026 Heritage Foundation report says Chinese state-owned defense enterprises are said to be producing ammunitionadvanced weapons systems and other equipment at rates approximately five to six times faster than their American counterparts.
The report further estimates that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could significantly increase production of selected types of ammunition by approximately 150–250% within six to eight months of national mobilization.
He attributes this potential to military-civilian fusion policies, automated “smart factory” production lines, rapid conversion of dual-use civilian industry, and China’s access to critical inputs such as rare earth elements and energy materials.
In contrast, Seth Jones argues in a May 2026 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) REPORT that the US military lacks sufficient munitions and industrial readiness for a protracted war with China, particularly in long-range strikes and air defense systems.
According to Jones, US stockpiles of long-range attack missiles and air defense interceptors were already low before the Iran War and were further depleted during the conflict.
He notes that replenishment timelines are long, taking more than four years for some SM-3 IIA interceptors and approximately three years for systems such as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors, SM-6, SM-3 IB, Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM), Tomahawk Cruise Missiles, IstanbulStoffSurints.
Recognizing those dangers, Tom Karako and Jerry McGinn, in a CSIS podcast this month, advocate expanding multi-year procurement contracts, increasing funding for munitions production, expanding the industrial base through second- and third-source suppliers, and pursuing co-production agreements with allies to strengthen U.S. missile production capacity.
They stress the need for consistent signals of government demand to give industry the confidence to invest in manpower, assembly lines and legacy materials, while also promoting a “very lean mix” of munitions that combines high-precision weapons with cheaper mass production systems and expanded production capacity.
As China continues to expand its missile arsenal, industrial base, and precision strike capabilities, the evolving Indo-Pacific balance may increasingly depend not only on operational military power, but also on which side can sustain high-intensity missile warfare over the long term.
