Xi is making his first overseas trip in 2026, having become increasingly selective about making state visits since the pandemic. After hosting Trump and Putin separately, the choice is strategic.
“The trip ensures that no one can reshape the security architecture of the peninsula without its consent,” said Seong-Hyon Lee, a senior fellow at the George HW Bush Foundation for US-China Relations.
Beijing is also realistic in its response to Kim’s clear nuclear ambitions.
In April, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Pyongyang and met with Kim. Observers noted the absence of the word “denuclearization” in the visit’s statement, a departure from China’s standard line, which calls for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
“The most visible sign of the visit may be a silence: if China’s official reading leaves out the word ‘denuclearization,’ Beijing has effectively accepted North Korea as a nuclear state, inserting the issue into its broader buffer strategy against the US,” Lee said.
In return, China could demand greater access to the estuary of the Tumen River, which forms part of the border between the two countries, and navigation rights in waters off the east coast of the Korean Peninsula.
Ultimately, Kim is likely to give Xi a grand and lavish welcome on a symbolic level, but China may not be able to extract much from an increasingly confident Kim, experts say.
“He will give Xi Jinping a welcome befitting the head of state of their giant neighbor, but he will not play the malleable ‘little brother,'” Chinoy said.
