As India’s stealth fighter gap widens, Russia is pitching the Su-57 as a solution – but production realities may tell a different story.
This month, Defense News reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin renewed his offer of unlimited joint production and technology transfer for Russia’s fifth-generation Su-57 stealth fighter during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.
This strategic proposal directly addresses India’s critical capability gap: The Indian Air Force currently lacks fifth-generation stealth platforms, while neighboring China is rapidly growing its fleet and Pakistan reportedly plans to buy Chinese J-35 stealth jets.
Although India previously pulled out of a similar co-development project with Russia in 2018 due to cost and technology disputes, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. confirmed that they are now awaiting Russia’s financial quote to present to air force officials.
Indian defense planners face an important dilemma: Procuring two to three interim Su-57 squadrons could quickly address regional threats.
However, the multibillion-dollar deal could divert crucial resources and reduce motivation to develop India’s indigenous fifth-generation fighter, which is unlikely to become operational before 2035.
US Army ODIN database describes the Su-57 as a lead-and-strike fighter that combines low observables, internal weapon bays, advanced sensor fusion, and an active phased-array (AESA) radar with exceptional maneuverability.
According to the database, the Su-57 can cruise at speeds of up to Mach 2, maintain supersonic flight without afterburners, and has a combat range exceeding 1,500 kilometers. Its extensive use of composite materials increases stealth and reduces weight, while its aerodynamic design supports extreme high-angle-of-attack maneuvers.
Furthermore, Russia has produced a two-seat version of the Su-57. The additional crew could enable long-range air defense and strike missions, and possibly serve as a “mission commander” for loyal wing drones like the Okhotnik.
The Su-57 has already been exported, with two units delivered to Algeria in November 2025as part of an order for 12 aircraft.
As for the Su-57’s combat record, Army Rec REPORTS this month Russia used the aircraft in Ukraine, launching attacks with Kh-59/69 missiles up to 400 kilometers behind the front line, rather than penetrating protected airspace.
The report adds that launch distance, altitude management, controlled flight paths, electronic protection and precision-guided weapons increase the aircraft’s survivability.
Such employment mirrors the doctrine used by both sides during the May 2025 air clashes over Kashmir, in which no aircraft from either side crossed national bordersreflecting the seriousness with which both sides view each other’s air defense capabilities.
Beyond exercising caution, this doctrine may have been intended to prevent escalation as the conflict devolved into a war of drone and missile exchanges, precluding border crossings by air or ground forces and mass mobilization.
In view of this, the Su-57 can provide a qualitative solution to the modernization challenges of the Indian Air Force exposed during the May 2025 air clashes over Kashmir.
Peter Layton mentioned in a November 2025 aerospace review that India lost two, or possibly three fighters – a French-made Rafale, a Russian-made MiG-29 and possibly a Russian-made Su-30.
Most notably, a Chinese-made Pakistani J-10C using a PL-15 long-range missile was credited with downing one of India’s Rafale jetssuggesting that Chinese weapons may now be able to compete with major Western systems.
Furthermore, Pakistan’s chain of aerial assassinations of Chinese origin “ABC”. – locked by land-based systems such as the HQ-9P air defense system, PL-15 missiles launched by J-10C fighter jets and guided by the ZDK-03 airborne warning and control (AWACS) to their targets – stands in stark contrast to India’s mixed ecosystem that combines integrated Western, Russian and domestic systems.
Additionally, the Pakistan Air Force may be on the verge of a major ecosystem upgrade, with defense security in Asia reporting this month, along with the J-35, Pakistan may purchase the KJ-500 AWACS and HQ-19 air defense systems, improving its Chinese-made kill chain but at the same time deepening its dependence on Chinese military equipment.
China has positioned J-20 stealth fighters at Shigatse Air Base in Tibetnear the disputed Himalayan border with India. These planes are less than 160 kilometers from India’s Sikkim border and the Siliguri Corridor.
Taken together, these developments could erode India’s traditional qualitative advantage in the air domain.
In addition, India may not have enough fighter jets for its needs, with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) pointing to February 2026 that the Indian Air Force has around 29 fighter and ground attack squadrons, well below the minimum target of 42 fighter squadrons.
However, the question remains whether Russia can produce enough Su-57s to meet India’s needs. Peter Suciu points out in January 2026 ITEM to The National Interest (TNI) that as of that date, Russia appears to have only 32 Su-57 units, including prototypes and non-combat models – far short of its stated goal of having 76 units by 2027-2028.
Suciu says shipments have fallen due to supply chain and financing constraints. He mentions that, at a price of $100 million per plane, Russia has sought foreign buyers to subsidize the costs of the plane.
However, Ukraine’s deep blows to Russia have destroyed two Su-57s on the ground in April 2026, AND a fire in the same month at the Komsomolsk-on-Amur plant, production of critical aircraft composite materials could further slow already low production rates by disrupting key supply chain nodes.
Moreover, India’s long-standing preference for Russian weapons appears to be undergoing a significant structural change. Multiple datasets from STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL LAW peace research Institute (SIPRI) show that while Russia remained India’s top supplier from 2017 to 2025 – accounting for 46% of Indian imports in 2017–21, 45% in 2018–22, 36% in 2019–23 and 40% in 2021–25 – the overall volume has declined.
This decline comes from the expansion of India’s domestic defense production and a deliberate strategy to diversify its supplier base.
Driven by ongoing geopolitical tensions with China and Pakistan, India is shifting towards Western suppliers, placing major new and planned orders with France, Israel and the US rather than Russia.
Moreover, Russia’s export capacity faces long-term constraints due to trade sanctions, international pressure and the mandate to prioritize its domestic military needs after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Consequently, two-thirds of Russia’s shrinking global arms exports are now concentrated in just three countries: India, China and Kazakhstan.
The Su-57 could offer India a faster path to fifth-generation capability, but it remains unclear whether Russia can reliably supply the aircraft in the numbers India requires — or whether doing so would come at the expense of India’s long-term quest for defense self-sufficiency.
