The Trump administration’s decision on it carry out a naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has raised tensions in the Persian Gulf to new and more dangerous levels.
The move was announced by US President Donald Trump after negotiations for a ceasefire with Iran broke down on April 11, in part because of Iran’s desire to retain control of the vital Strait of Hormuz, through which a fifth of the world’s oil passes.
The blockade is designed to neutralize Iran’s efforts to do so close the strait to shipping considers it unfriendly to Tehran and implements it a payment system for other ships transiting the strait.
The US blockade can be seen as the latest attempt by the Trump administration to project force. But it also rejects one challenge for Beijing. China has been the main buyer of Iranian oil in recent years and is one of the few countries whose shipments can enter the strait unopposed.
It seemed very likely that this status would be tested on April 14 when Rich Starrya Chinese owned and operated tanker under US sanctions for transporting Iranian oil, transited the strait unchallenged by US warships in the region.
But it has since been reported that the ship returned to the Gulf of Oman and headed back to the Strait of Hormuz. The United States now claims that six ships that tried to transit the strait were turned away.
Rich Starry’s willingness to avoid a possible Sino-American clash suggests Beijing is not yet ready to challenge Washington’s red lines, especially so close to a state visit by the US president next month, a trip postponed from March 31 as a result of the conflict in Iran. China has called the US blockade a “dangerous and irresponsible act”.
But what appears to be a deliberate decision not to challenge the blockade could be interpreted as another example of Chinese weakness, which will perhaps encourage Washington to take more active measures against China’s tanker fleet.
However, US seizure of any Chinese ships it could certainly provoke a more dangerous outcome, with the prospect of increased tensions or even conflict with Beijing. If the US captures a Chinese ship, Beijing can see this as an act of war on the part of Washingtonif it chooses to interpret such an incident as an American attempt to stifle the Chinese economy.
While an armed clash between the US and China in the Persian Gulf is unlikely, it is possible that Beijing could deploy its Djibouti-based fleet to the region. China’s base in Djibouti is its home 48th Escort Group which has previously conducted anti-piracy operations in the region as well as escort duties for Chinese-owned vessels in the region.
This raises question whether Washington was willing to fire on Chinese warships to enforce its blockade.
China’s challenge to the US
China’s response to a US blockade could be more indirect in nature. One form this can take is PROVISION of Chinese weapons systems for Iran.
China’s Beidou satellite navigation system has has already played an important role in directing Iran’s existing missile stockpile against American and Israeli targets. Further Chinese military assistance, particularly in the form of missiles and drones, could help Beijing retaliate indirectly through Iran.
New York Times recently reported Intelligence sources claim China may have sent shoulder-launched missiles to Iran – but this has been strongly denied by Beijing.
On the other hand, a possible Chinese retaliation may not even occur in the Middle East. Instead, it is possible that Beijing could target US assets and interests in the Asia-Pacific.
This comes at a time when OTHER USEFUL US allies in the region have become increasingly vulnerable, with several missile systems being deployed in the Middle East by South Korea. Accompanied by lack of fuel as a result of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the region is potentially even more exposed to China’s moves if Beijing chooses to act.
While Beijing prefers a more stable Middle East and global economy, being one of the main beneficiaries of globalization, there are some possibilities for China’s broader goals.
One of the biggest is the status of Renminbi. It has become prominent in the Persian Gulf oil trade, with Iran mainly dealing in currency transactions. This is consistent with the emergence of the petroyuan in the 21st century to challenge the dominance of the petrodollar.
Next to China position as a supplier of aviation fuel to the Asia-Pacific, the conflict has embedded and strengthened China’s role in the global economy.
In addition, the potential shortage of oil could open the door to large-scale electric vehicle (EV) adoptionwith Chinese firms such as BYD being potential beneficiaries of a future EV boom.
This resonates The popularity of Japanese cars during the OPEC crisis of the 1970s, due to their relatively high fuel efficiency in contrast to American and European models.
As a result, a prolonged oil crisis in the Middle East could make firms such as BYD become household names, furthering the influence of Brand China.
In addition, the crisis could further China’s push to present itself as one more stable partner in contrast to Washington’s more chaotic approach. This has gained traction due to the perceived unpredictability of the Trump administration over the past 15 months.
China already has one relatively favorable global image when compared to the US. A wider conflict with Iran will probably take this further. As a result, Rich Starry’s path may determine the course of Sino-American competition and the world this competition will shape.
Tom Harper is a professor of international relations, University of East London
This article was reprinted from Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read on original article.
