A former Australian resident living in Iraq led the attack on Melbourne’s Adass Israel Synagogue in December 2024, Mike Burgess, head of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, has revealed.
Burgess said Iran, which was behind the attack, recruited the man through a “complex network of militia groups based in Iraq”.
“Appreciating his high wealth and criminal connections, the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) protected him and supported his illegal enterprises.
“That changed dramatically after ASIO publicly named Iran’s involvement in the arson.
The man’s Iranian supporters lost their enthusiasm and after further pressure from Australian and local law enforcement, they put him in jail.
Burgess gave the details as he delivered his annual threat assessment speech on Wednesday evening. He also said an Australian national based in Iran orchestrated the firebombing of the Lewis Continental Kitchen in Bondi in October 2024, which was “the first major attack in the summer of anti-Semitism”.
“This person is a senior agent of the Qods Force of the IRGC, which runs its networks around the world.
“We know more about him than he realizes, including the name of his superior in Iran and the department he works for. Department Eleven Thousand, a covert unit within the IRGC’s Qods Force, is responsible for coordinating operations in the West.”
Burgess said he could not name the individuals because of the need to protect the ongoing investigation and related prosecutions.
“But I want them to understand this: We know who you are, we know what you’ve done, and we know who you work for.”
Of anti-Semitism in general, Burgess said it was often viewed through a narrow lens. But it can come from “different sources simultaneously, challenging traditional definitions, assumptions and approaches.”
Sadly and illogically, hatred of Jews is common to almost all violent extremist groups. Neo-Nazis are anti-Semites. Islamic extremism is anti-Semitic.
Issue-motivated extremists can be anti-Semitic, especially when they subscribe to conspiracy theories and stereotypes about the Jewish community.
Nation states can be anti-Semitic, as we saw with the arson attacks against Jewish communities in Melbourne and Sydney by criminals led by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Anarchists and revolutionary groups can be anti-Semitic.
He said Australian companies seen to have links to Israel were being targeted with “repeated acts of vandalism and arson by far-left activists”.
“My position is that violent anti-Semitism is not a single or simple intelligence problem.”
The fire explosion of a synagogue “can be simultaneously criminal arson, foreign intervention, incitement of communal violence and politically motivated violence”.
And when Iran directs arson, it is an act of state-sponsored terrorism.
Burgess once again highlighted the degradation of Australia’s security environment. “Great power competition is fueling an insatiable appetite for strategic advantage. As a result, espionage and foreign interference are at extremes, while preparation for sabotage is growing in scale and sophistication.”
“At the same time, politically motivated violence – which includes terrorism – remains an acute concern.”
Burgess said the degrading security environment was characterized by “simultaneous, cascading and complex threats” which could be categorized as “threats to life” and “threats to our way of life”.
In a speech packed, as usual, with case studies, Burgess told the story of a man who had been subjected to “a relentless campaign of intimidation” by a foreign regime that for a decade had demanded he return to his country of birth to handle unspecified corruption investigations.
The harassment included arresting the man’s relatives living abroad, interrogating them and subjecting them to a travel ban.
“After receiving a desperate plea from one of the arrested relatives, an Australian-based family member tried to sort things out. The family member flew to a foreign country to meet the regime. They interrogated the traveler for hours and bluntly said that the individual would only be allowed to return to Australia if he agreed to keep in phone contact with the regime and submit reports about the target of the attacks.”
Burgess said ASIO knew of five regimes targeting Australians with harassment, with one country particularly active.
“In 2023 alone, that country forced at least eight individuals to leave Australia for their country of birth. Five were Australian citizens or permanent residents. Three never returned.”
Burgess said Australia’s defense captives, particularly AUKUS, were priority targets for foreign intelligence services.
“A spy from a foreign intelligence service approached an Australian internet security certificate holder, claiming to be from a consulting company.
“The spy paid the official to write two reports on Australia’s relationship with our Pacific neighbors and then, thinking he was connected, offered money for inside information on AUKUS. The foreign intelligence service wanted knowledge of Pillar 1 progress, Pillar 2 technologies, how much money was being invested, Australia’s geo-strategic relationship, Australia’s public ambitions and Australia’s three ambitions. opinion.
“I am pleased to report that the permit holder became suspicious and reported the contact.”
Burgess also said nation-state hackers had compromised the network of a critical Australian infrastructure provider. They were apparently preparing for sabotage, designing the network so that it could be crippled later.
“Cyber sabotage is an evolving threat and I have established dedicated teams to combat it. As ASIO’s understanding grows, so does our level of concern.
“The scale of this activity – led by one nation state in particular – is hard to overestimate. You’d be surprised how extensive our warranty coverage is. We struggle to find a single place in our region that hasn’t been compromised by this state’s cyber apparatus.”
He said critical infrastructure in energy and communications, as well as supporting the military, were “primary targets”.
“In this case, a state-sponsored group not only gained access to the Australian critical infrastructure provider, it successfully obtained the credentials – login details and passwords – for active users of the networks, including the IT professionals who maintain it.”
Burgess struck a defensive note when talking about ASIO’s counter-terrorism activity in recent times, which could be read as a response to criticism that the organization had not prioritized counter-terrorism enough.
“Even as rising espionage and foreign interference demanded more attention, the fight against terrorism remained a priority – as I publicly stated in ASIO’s 2022 Annual Threat Assessment.
“We increased CT resources when we raised the threat level in 2024 and it continued to increase in the months leading up to Bondi. The resources followed the threat.
“The number of ASIO officers working in our counter-terrorism mission in 2025 was almost double the number in 2005.
“This reflects a greater ASIO, but also an ongoing commitment to leave no known serious threat unaddressed.”
But he said that in the new terrorism environment, even a “vast army” of ASIO officers may not be enough “to find an individual who has been radicalized online and uses encrypted communications”.
Michelle Grattan is a professor professor, University of Canberra.
This article was reprinted from Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read on original article.
