In the Balikatan military exercise taking place in the Philippines, troops from the Philippines, the US, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and France have been receiving real combat training – and lots of it.
It was made with China in mind – even if no one will say so. This is the label.
Additionally, forces are training in the area that would be part of the “operational zone” in case the People’s Liberation Army moves against Taiwan.
This includes the northern Philippines facing the South China Sea and the Luzon Strait, also known as the Bashi Channel, between Taiwan and the Philippines. The PLA will have to move through this channel to protect its right flank or to conduct operations on the eastern side of Taiwan.
It’s always better to train where you’re going to fight, and the military improves just like sports teams do. Training with partners is even more beneficial – so you’re not a stranger when it comes time to actually fight.
But beyond the operational benefits that come from Balikatan-type exercises, there are psychological and political benefits that are sometimes overlooked.
When militaries exercise together, they tend to see each other differently—not least as more equal partners. Along with increased confidence in their own and their partners’ abilities, it tends to thicken political alliances.
Excessively unbalanced defense relationships are dangerous. One party finally feels put and restrained. The other thinks he is doing too much – for an ungrateful partner. This weakens a relationship and, if left unchecked, can destroy it.
The Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) sent a large contingent to join this year’s Balikatan combat drills for the first time, and is otherwise rapidly improving its capabilities. It’s a good reminder of how improved operational capabilities bring psychological and political advantages.
Not so long ago, the Japan-US defense relationship was dangerously unbalanced – with Japan pathologically dependent on the US military for protection.
When Japan’s amphibious force began in late 2011 with a small group of American and Japanese officers quietly pushing things forward, the idea was in part to give Japan a much-needed capability.
An island nation with a large maritime territory must be able to conduct amphibious operations along the coast. Such operations are necessary both for disaster relief and to fight an enemy invader.
And the effort was also a way to address a fundamental weakness of the JSDF: the unwillingness and inability of the JSDF’s three services to operate together. The amphibious capability was a mandated function to encourage ground and naval forces to cooperate—and, eventually, to work in the Air Self-Defense Force.
But there was more to it than just filling in a missing operational capability. All this built confidence in the JSDF – which at times seemed to have an inferiority complex to US forces. Even Japan’s political class had for years disparaged the JSDF and its capabilities.
American officers also wanted the US military to take Japan seriously. Apart from the US Navy, the basic thinking in many parts of the US military was that the Americans would take care of things and the Japanese could sit in the corner.
This was causing resentment in the JSDF—and contributing to fatigue among Japan’s political class, if not defense antagonism.
When the JSDF became able to conduct complex, perhaps rudimentary, amphibious operations, within a few years its confidence grew. And the political class also saw Japan as capable of playing a more active role in the nation’s defense – and also alliance operations.
Japan also became less respectful of the US.
On the other hand, the American side saw Japan as a more useful and equal (or at least less unequal) ally.
All this led to a political strengthening of bilateral relations. Which made it harder for China to separate the two politically, for example by sending China “white lobbyists” to Capitol Hill or on Sunday shows claiming that “Japan expects you Americans to do all the hard work and die for them.” This would resonate widely.
And it wouldn’t be a vote winner in DC.
Conversely, and just as importantly, consider the psychological effect of fixing things on one’s adversaries – like China. A more militarily capable target nation is bad enough. China hates it when its intended victims are better able to defend themselves, and is even angrier when its intended victims band together to defend themselves. There is a reason why Xi Jinping complains about ‘blockages’.
So by Balikatan and similar exercises, free nations are increasing their ability to resist Chinese aggression, but, just as importantly, they are realizing that they can resist such aggression and do not have to submit to inevitable Chinese dominance. Maybe next year, Taiwan might get cold.
Colonel Grant Newsham (US Marines – Ret.) is the author of When China Strikes: A Warning to America.
