There is a lively and, at times, sharply divided discourse in India today over its foreign policy choices on the Iranian crisis. At the heart of this debate is a simple but uncomfortable question: Is India cautiously cautious, needlessly timid, or has it slipped into strategic ambiguity?
After last weekend’s failed talks in Islamabad, critics argued that India has underutilized its considerable economic weight, diaspora influence and political capital in the Persian Gulf. They claimed that New Delhi’s preference for quiet, behind-the-scenes diplomacy has left diplomatic room for Pakistan, which has – at least optically – emerged as a facilitator in the high-stakes negotiations.
Recent developments seem to reinforce this perception. When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke to US President Donald Trump, the conversation appeared to focus on aligning red lines — keeping energy flows stable and supply chains intact — rather than signaling any deeper Indian role. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar’s visit to the UAE, too, was more about reassurance and coordination than intervention.
To many observers, this seems like excessive caution, while to others, it seems like drift. However, this apparent caution is less a symptom of indecision than a reflection of structural constraints.
India’s foreign policy in the Persian Gulf is a textual case of strategic autonomy under duress. New Delhi is bound in a dense web of relationships that pull it in different directions at once.
It is closely related to the US in technology, finance and defense; dependent on Iran for energy and connectivity through Chabahar; deeply engaged with Israel in defense; and economically intertwined with the Gulf states through trade, investment and the livelihoods of millions of Indian workers.
In such a situation, there is no clean move available. Supporting Iran risks alienating the United States, the Gulf and Israel. US and Israeli support risks losing access to Iran and exposing India’s energy lifelines through the Strait of Hormuz.
Going in as an intermediary carries its own risks – failure would damage credibility without guaranteeing any real impact. In other words, what looks like reluctance is, in many ways, the price of strategic autonomy.
India’s room for maneuver is further compressed by external dynamics. The China-Pakistan strategic partnership has reduced its bandwidth for regional activism in the Middle East, while renewed US-Pakistan engagement introduces diplomatic irritants and complicates regional optics.
Above all, India’s vulnerability to energy shocks – given its dependence on flows through the Strait of Hormuz – acts as a strong constraint on any adventurous policy changes.
Domestic considerations, although secondary, have also reinforced this cautious attitude. India’s vulnerability to energy price shocks, given its dependence on supplies through the Strait of Hormuz, makes any external miscalculations politically costly at home.
The presence of a large Indian diaspora across the Gulf further raises the stakes, as instability in the region can quickly translate into domestic economic and political pressures. In this context, a calibrated and low-risk approach is not just a strategic preference, but also a political necessity.
In contrast, Pakistan’s apparent activism stems from a fundamentally different strategic model. Positioned geographically between Iran and the Gulf, maintaining working ties with Tehran, enjoying patronage ties with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and supported by China while engaging with the United States, Islamabad has emerged as a politically low-cost venue for talks that may have been difficult to secure elsewhere.
Its relief efforts are enabled less by autonomous force and more by outside sponsorship. This distinction is crucial. Pakistan’s role is that of a facilitator, not a shaper of results. Its influence is derivative – enabled by external support rather than its economic or strategic weight.
What looks like bold diplomacy is, in reality, a different strategic choice: a willingness to trade a degree of autonomy for immediate relevance and support. In contrast, India continues to bear the cost of maintaining autonomy, even at the expense of low visibility or the appearance of passivity, and reflects a deliberate effort to maintain long-term strategic flexibility.
That said, the criticism within India is not entirely misplaced. Strategic autonomy, when overextended, can blur into strategic ambiguity. A policy that minimizes risk by default can also limit initiative. The question, therefore, is not whether India should give up strategic autonomy—it will not—but whether it can exercise it more proactively.
However, there are scenarios and thresholds where India will be forced to move more decisively. Continued disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, which sends energy prices spiraling, would directly hit India’s economy and force a stronger response.
A large-scale crisis involving the Indian diaspora in the Persian Gulf would require active diplomatic engagement. And if the conflict escalates into an all-out confrontation between a US-Israeli-Government bloc and Iran, India may find neutrality increasingly untenable, forcing it to bend to protect its core interests. Even in such scenarios, India is unlikely to abandon strategic autonomy; at most, it will extend and recalibrate it.
Until such causes emerge, however, India is likely to stay on its current course—engaged, vigilant but not overtly interventionist. There is another, less discussed reason for this limitation: unpredictability.
US signaling, especially under President Donald Trump, has been inconsistent enough to make any high-visibility diplomatic role dangerous. India has little incentive to enter into a process where outcomes – and narratives – can suddenly change.
Pakistan may have been in the limelight, but India has the stakes. India, for now, is choosing to play a longer game – one that prioritizes flexibility over visibility and positioning over posture.
Whether this will be wisdom or a missed opportunity will only become clear when the crisis moves from confrontation to resolution. That’s when real impact—not optical prominence—will matter.
But if the conflict drags on, the Indian economy is bound to become increasingly exposed, and India may not have much choice but to get off the fence.
Raghu Gururaj is a former ambassador and retired Indian foreign service officer
