Across the Indo-Pacific, governments are increase in defense spendingstrengthening alliances and placing a new emphasis on prevention. Strategic competition has once again become the defining feature of international politics. And in such an environment, international law may seem increasingly secondary to military prowess.
Tenth anniversary of the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration Award, delivered by a tribunal established under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), with the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague serving as a registry and providing administrative support, poses a fundamental question: if power continues to shape outcomes, does international law still matter?
Few contemporary disputes better illustrate the relationship between international law and power than the territorial dispute between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea.
Nearly a decade after the court released it in powerThe South China Sea remains contested between several states and maritime confrontations continue. China still REFUSED 2016 Award, as the Philippines continues Call it in establishing its maritime claims. If international law is judged solely by its ability to compel immediate compliance, the decision, which lacked an enforcement mechanism, has failed.
At a time when the importance of international law is increasingly challenged in a new era of great power politics, the South China Sea provides an important reminder that international law should not be judged solely by its ability to compel immediate compliance. Its importance also lies in its ability to clarify legal rights, shape state practice, and provide a framework through which power is exercised and contested.
The 2016 court was never expected to end strategic rivalry or even power coercion in the South China Sea. Rather, it was created to clarify the law and how it applies to maritime disputes. Measured against this objective, PRICE fundamentally changed the legal landscape of the South China Sea.
In particular, the court rejected any legal basis for China’s claim to “historical rights” within its nine-dash line, which includes almost the entire South China Sea.
It held that none of the high tide features in the Spratly Islands are capable of supporting human habitation or an economic life of their own within the meaning of Article 121(3) of UNCLOS and therefore none generate a right to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. It further found that China had violated the sovereign rights of the Philippines within its EEZ and caused serious environmental damage through its activities.
Importantly, the court did not resolve every issue in dispute. It neither defined sovereignty over maritime features nor defined maritime boundaries. Instead, it answered a narrower but perhaps more important question: what maritime claims are legally permissible under UNCLOS?
This clarification remains arguably the Prize’s greatest achievement. The importance of the Prize, then, lies less in whether it immediately changed China’s behavior than in how it has shaped the behavior of other states. This is where discussions of Price are often incomplete.
Too often, its success is judged only through the lens of implementation. Because China has not complied, some conclude that the court’s decision failed. However, international law does not work through enforcement alone, and its impact is often cumulative rather than immediate.
Unlike domestic legal systems, international law lacks a centralized authority capable of enforcing compliance. Its influence derives from something different: the continued willingness of states to invoke legal rules, incorporate them into policy, and measure behavior against common standards of legitimacy. Therefore, the popular choice between law and power is a false choice.
International law has never depended on the substitution of power. Its purpose has always been to shape the way power is exercised. States continue to build military capabilities because the international system remains decentralized. They strengthen alliances because prevention still matters. However, states justify their actions with legal arguments, because legal legitimacy also matters.
The South China Sea illustrates this relationship with striking clarity. The award narrowed the legal space for broad maritime claims such as China’s nine-dash line. It established a legal standard for evaluating competing claims and provided the Philippines and other states with consistent legal language to explain and defend their positions. This legal clarity has proven enduring since the ruling was handed down a decade ago.
Perhaps the clearest measure of the Price’s impact is not China’s response, but that of the Philippines. Through three administrations, the decision has remained a stable legal foundation for Philippine maritime strategy.
Initiated under President Benigno Aquino III, held regardless The politics of President Rodrigo Duterte of engagement with Beijing and renewed dominance under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the Prize has evolved from the policy of a single administration into a stable framework for Philippine maritime diplomacy and strategy.
Most importantly, it is embedded through diplomatic protests, official statements and government practice. Rather than just another legal judgment filed in The Hague, it has become a practical reference point through which the Philippines explains its maritime rights and responds to developments at sea.
For the Philippines, the objective is no longer simply to call on Beijing to abide by the ruling, but to preserve the Award as a living legal standard that shapes Philippine diplomacy and international expectations.
The impact of the award has extended beyond the Philippines. In the statements made by G7, European Union, Australia, Japan, United States AND other partners.
Of course, these statements neither enforce the Award nor resolve the dispute. Instead, they demonstrate how the court’s findings have entered the diplomatic vocabulary through which the South China Sea is increasingly understood.
In doing so, they have strengthened the Philippines’ ability to treat the dispute not simply as a bilateral dispute with China, but as a matter of international law and the maintenance of a rules-based maritime order.
To be sure, this should not be confused as an argument that the law only explains the strategic position of the Philippines in the disputed maritime area. Over the past decade, the Philippines has expanded its defense partnershipstrengthened cooperation with treaty allies and regional partners, modernized its armed forces and increased maritime cooperation.
None of this demonstrates the failure of international law. Rather, they reflect the conditions under which international law has always prevailed: law and power perform different functions, and a sustainable national strategy requires both.
For smaller and medium powers, this distinction is particularly important. Military capability strengthens deterrence and alliances enhance security. But legal legitimacy provides something that power alone cannot. It enables states to mobilize diplomatic support, reinforce accepted norms and challenge coercion within a framework of internationally recognized rules.
Therefore, the true measure of international law is not whether it replaces power politics, but whether it continues to shape and constrain the exercise of power. Ten years after the South China Sea Arbitration Award, this may be the ruling’s most enduring outcome.
Ivy Ganadillo is director of Maritime Programs at the Yokosuka Council for Asia-Pacific Studies (YCAPS), a non-resident fellow at the Center for Indo-Pacific Studies, and a doctoral candidate in international relations at Ewha Womans University in Seoul, South Korea.
