“Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.”
Maxim of Napoleon Bonaparte may have been on the minds of policymakers in Moscow and Beijing in recent weeks as the US war in Iran dragged on.
And now that a 14-day ceasefire between Tehran and Washington is in place – with both sides claiming “CONQUEST” – Russian and Chinese leaders still have an opportunity to take advantage of what many see as America’s the latest madness in the Middle East.
Throughout the weekly conflict, China AND Russia struck a delicate balance. Both refused to give Iran – seen by a different degrees like one ally of both nations – their full support or sinking any real costs into the conflict.
Instead, they opted for limited help in the form of small scale intelligence AND diplomatic support.
Like one researcher of international security and great power politics I believe this is for good reason. Beijing and Moscow were fully aware that Iran could not “win” against the combined military might of the US and Israel. Rather, Iran only needed to survive to serve the interests of Washington’s main geopolitical rivals.
Below are four ways the US war in Iran has damaged Washington’s standing in the great power rivalries of the 21st century.
1. Losing the war of influence in the Middle East
As I explore in my book “Protection of enemies“, the US has long struggled to balance competing objectives in the Middle East. During the Cold War, this meant limiting The influence of the Soviet Union in the region, while contending with the development of nuclear weapons by two troublesome allies, Israel and Pakistan.
Until the 2020s, priorities in Washington aimed to limit the influence of the US’s great power rivals – China and to a lesser extent Russia – in the Middle East.
However, under Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, China and Russia have sought to do so increase their footprint in the region through a series of formal alliances and informal measures.
For Russia, this took the form of an alliance with Iran, while partnering with Tehran to support the now deposed regime of President Bashar Assad during the Syrian civil war. Meanwhile, China raised its diplomatic profile in the Middle East, particularly with acting as an intermediary after Saudi Arabia and Iran restored diplomatic relations in 2023.
The irony of Iran’s latest war is that it follows a period in which circumstances were unfavorable to Russian and Chinese ambitions to increase their influence in the Middle East.
of Assad’s fall in December 2024 deprived Russia of its only reliable ally in the region. AND Trump’s tour in May 2025 in the Gulf statesin which he secured major technological and economic deals with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain, was intended to counter China’s economic and economic growth. diplomatic influence in those countries.
With Washington perceived as one increasingly unreliable defenderthe Gulf states may request greater security and economic cooperation elsewhere.
2. Averting US eyes from other strategic goals
In expanding military, diplomatic and economic ties in the Middle East, Russia and China over the past two decades have been capitalizing on Washington’s desire to divert her assets and attention from the region after two the costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Trump’s decision to go to war with Iran directly contradicts that national security strategy his administration was released in November 2025. According to the strategy, the administration would prioritize the Western Hemisphere and Indo-Pacificwhile the importance of the Middle East will “decline”.
IN co-starting a war in Tehran with Israel, without any prior consultation with Washington’s other allies, Trump has shown a complete disregard for their strategic and economic concerns. NATO, already battered by Trump’s repeated threats to the alliance and plans for Greenland, it has now shown further signs of internal divisions.
This offers benefits to China and Russia, which have long sought to take advantage of the rift between America and its allies.
The irony, again, is that the war in Iran came as Trump’s vision of the US as the hegemonic power in the Western Hemisphere was making inroads. International law and legitimacy concerns aside, Washington he had pulled out a thorn in his leg with Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela and replaced him with a more compliant leader.
3. Disproportionate economic consequences
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran, where about 20% of the world’s oil passes throughit was as predictable as it was destructive to US interests.
But for Russia, it meant higher oil prices that fueled its war economy. It also led to temporary but continuous the easing of US sanctions, which has given Moscow a much-needed lifeline after years of economic pressure over the war in Ukraine.
While a prolonged shutdown and widespread damage to oil and natural gas infrastructure in Iran and the Gulf states undoubtedly hurts China energy security and economyThese were risks Xi seems willing to accept, at least for a while.
And by building up a domestic oil reserve and diversifying energy sources to include solar, electric batteries and coal, China is much better positioned to weather a protracted global. energy crisis than the US.
Indeed, Beijing has made strides in the past year for it promoting domestic consumption as a source of economic growth, rather than being so dependent on global trade. This may have given China some protection during the global economic shock caused by the war in Iran, as well as push the economy further along its path.
The more the US loses control over events in the strait, the more it loses influence in the region – especially when Iran seems to be setting limits on ships from unfriendly nations.
4. Loss of global leadership
of Trump willingness to abandon talks to go to warAND contradictory rhetoric he has used throughout the Iran conflict has weakened the perception of the US as an honest broker.
This provides a massive soft power boost for Beijing. it Was China put pressure on Iran to accept the 14-day ceasefire proposal brokered by Pakistan. Indeed, China has slowly chipped away at America’s status as a premier global broker.
Beijing has successfully mediated in the past between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and that tried to do the same with Russia and Ukraine and Israel and the Palestinians.
Overall, the Iran war adds weight to Beijing’s US-led worldview the liberal international order is over. Even if China has benefited to some extent from the continuation of the war, its decision to help broker a cease-fire shows that China is increasingly assuming the mantle of global leadership that the US once held.
And for Russia, the Iran war, and the rift between Trump and America’s NATO allies over their lack of support for him, diverts world attention and US involvement from the war in Ukraine.
Jeffrey Taliaferro is a professor of political science, Tufts University
This article was reprinted from Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read on original article.
