“This is not our fight.” The phrase, used by some European leaders to explain why they have refused to send forces to join America and Israel in their attacks on Iran, has become infamous in Donald Trump’s White House and has put the future of the transatlantic alliance in fresh jeopardy.
The Iran conflict is neither Japan’s war nor anyone’s war in the Indo-Pacific region. And yet everyone is being affected by that war. Everyone will have to change their attitudes and assumptions as a result of the Iran war, in some small ways but also in some big ones.
With the conflict still unresolved, following the unsuccessful negotiations in Islamabad on April 11, it is too early to draw final conclusions about what will change from the war in Iran. The dramatic disruption that can be suddenly caused by war can disappear just as suddenly after the bombs and missiles fall silent, which is perhaps why financial markets have not reacted as strongly as might have been expected. They hope this war will be short.
However, several themes are already emerging that will indicate what kind of long-term changes are likely to result from the war in Iran. Five issues have already become apparent.
The most worrisome issue in the long term is the potential impact of this war on nuclear proliferation. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has boasted that, thanks to the nuclear weapons program successfully developed by his father and grandfather, his country would not have been vulnerable to the kind of attack Iran has received.
It is likely that many members of the Iranian regime now wish they had developed nuclear weapons sooner.
It is possible to argue that the Iran war will discourage nuclear proliferation – since the attempt to go nuclear could justify a US attack – and that if only the Clinton or Bush administrations had had the courage to attack North Korea during the early stages of its nuclear program, the world would be a safer place. However, it was always too risky to actually attack North Korea, especially given its close relationship with China.
In the Indo-Pacific there are already two states with nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan, in addition to China and North Korea.
The surprisingly open recent discussions in official Japanese circles about whether Japan should cast aside its nuclear taboo and develop a nuclear capability probably reflects concerns that other countries, particularly South Korea, may soon do so, and that the American promise of “enhanced deterrence” — keeping allies protected under its nuclear umbrella — may no longer be credible enough.
A second emerging theme is related to this last concern: questions arising from the Iran war about the strength and credibility of the American-led deterrence in the Indo-Pacific against China, North Korea, and Russia.
America’s war against Iran has fully displayed the power and sophistication of its military forces. What has been surprising, however, is that in a war against an adversary already greatly weakened by Israeli and American attacks in June of last year, the US military so quickly used up so much of its stockpile of weapons and its best missile defense systems.
If this happens after only a few weeks of fighting a weak adversary, how credible can American deterrence be against a much stronger adversary, China?
Additionally, the war in Iran has resulted in the transfer of US Navy ships, regiments, missile defense systems and other assets from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East.
The immediate gaps left by these transfers are not the main concern, although no military strategist in the Indo-Pacific can now entertain the possibility, however small it may be, that the Iran war has created an opportunity that China or North Korea might be tempted to seize.
The main concern is that, despite spending nearly $1 trillion a year on defense, the U.S. military appears severely overstretched after only one short war.
Apparently, the concerns that have been expressed in recent years about the defense production capacity of the United States are valid. However, what it also suggests is that a very high proportion of US defense spending may go to fixed overheads, such as US military bases around the world, and very little to agile assets and inventories.
A third theme from the Iran war is that it has taught many countries lessons about what defending against future missile and drone attacks might really require. The Gulf states of the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have found themselves under repeated attacks from Iranian missiles and drones, against which their existing defense systems have been unable to adequately protect them.
Part of the reason for this has been the global shortage of sophisticated and expensive missile interceptors used in the US-made Patriot and THAAD defense systems, which the war in Ukraine had already exposed. But also the reason is that so far other countries have not had to learn from Ukraine’s experience of being attacked by swarms of low-cost drones. Now, the demand for Ukrainian-style anti-drone defense will increase, and not only in the Gulf. Japan should also invest in anti-drone defenses.
A fourth clear theme is the need for reserves and diversified supply chains of critical minerals and energy.
In recent years there has been much analysis of “choke points” that could provide leverage for one side during a war, but the potential use of the Strait of Hormuz in this way was surprisingly downplayed or even ignored by the United States. However, this narrow body of water, which is separated by Iran and Oman, had long been identified as a choke point, given that a fifth of the world’s annual oil supply flows through it by tanker.
Now, after Islamabad’s negotiations, the world must brace for a game of bluff between Trump and Iran over which side will dare try to stop the other from controlling the strait. Trump’s declaration that US warships will now block the strait and prevent the imposition of tariffs is a dare for Iran to try to stop them. It’s a bold play, but one that risks escalating the war once more.
Beyond this immediate question, the need to diversify routes and materials to make potential choke points less powerful is a clear conclusion to be drawn from the Hormuz crisis, as is the need for investment in larger strategic stockpiles of key commodities. Taiwan must surely now realize that its still small strategic energy reserves and other reserves make it highly vulnerable to a Chinese blockade.
Many of the other possible consequences will depend on what happens next in this war. But we can already see a fifth theme: that Donald Trump is easily angered by any failure of America’s allies to support him, even though he has spent much of the past year insulting and abusing them.
The Iran war has already increased the chances that Trump will pull out of NATO in a fit of rage. There is no real danger of him breaking away from America’s Indo-Pacific alliances, but this war has confirmed that power in America is now too concentrated in the hands of one man, the president. According to the US constitution, he must leave in less than three years, but in the meantime he can make many very personal decisions.
He is not “our” president, but no one can escape the consequences of what he does.
This is a slightly updated version of an article first published by Mainichi. Along with many other articles, it can be found on the author’s Substack, Bill Emmott’s Global View.
