There is an old English rhyme about Prince Frederick Duke of York, a man who marched ten thousand men up a hill only to have them march down again. Its origins lie in the military campaigns of the late 18th century, when ambition overtook strategy and movement replaced purpose. It is, in essence, a story about activity being confused with achievement.
The world should welcome the agreement to be signed by the United States and Iran on Friday. After more than three months of conflict, thousands of deaths and significant economic disruption, a return to diplomacy is clearly preferable to continued military confrontation. But this initial agreement should be understood for what it is: not a settlement, but the beginning of what is likely to be a difficult and protracted negotiation process.
Abbas Araghchi is the Iranian foreign minister and apparently still influential in Tehran despite everything. He is among the most accomplished diplomats I have met during my 35-year career at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When I was ambassador of Great Britain in Tehran he was my main interlocutor. Araghchi wrote a book last year. It provides a valuable piece for anyone dealing with Iran at this point:
“The style of Iranian negotiations is generally known in the world as the ‘bargaining style,’ which means continuous and tireless bargaining…. This method is a process of interaction that requires patience and great time, and thus, ‘he who gets tired and bored quickly will lose.’ wonder if at this point – feeling Bulgarian despite the bruises, and having the upper hand over the savvy American customer who wants to buy their sticky wares – Iran might be tempted to cut a hard bargain.
Most governments in the region and beyond will welcome the prospect of de-escalation. However, opposition remains strong within both Iran and Israel. Some influential Republicans are also worried about the concessions to Iran that might be required to secure a lasting peace. Even now, there is a residual risk that Washington could reverse course, as it has repeatedly done during the conflict. If it does, Iran, true to one of its basic foreign policy doctrines, will reciprocate. For now, however, diplomacy seems to have regained the initiative.
The immediate objective will be to stabilize the ceasefire and create a framework for more substantive negotiations. The war itself lasted only a few weeks, but the consequences have been much longer. Despite the overwhelming military superiority demonstrated by the United States and Israel, neither side achieved a decisive political outcome. Iran’s leadership survived. The Strait of Hormuz remained vulnerable to disruptions. The low-level confrontation continued through naval incidents, cyber operations and Iran’s use of proxy forces to inflict pain in the region.
This reality points to the likely destination of the next phase: an expanded version of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Any viable solution would almost certainly resemble a “JCPOA Plus.”
Such an agreement would extend beyond nuclear restrictions. It is likely to include expanded inspection and verification arrangements, limits on missile development, mechanisms to reduce maritime tensions in the Gulf and understandings governing the activities of Iran-backed groups across the region. In return, Iran would receive phased sanctions relief—ideally, including the lifting of primary U.S. sanctions that would lead to a real transformation for the better in Iran—acknowledgment, at least tacit, by the U.S. and the West of the Islamic Republic’s continuing oppressive political system, and guarantees against foreign-imposed regime change efforts.
Neither side would get everything they wanted. Washington would have to accept the continued existence of a regime that repeatedly invokes a 47-year-old national trauma caused by the hostage crisis of the US Embassy in Tehran, which lasted 444 days. Tehran will face restrictions on activities it considers essential to its security and autonomy. However, this is the nature of sustainable diplomacy. Successful deals are usually those that leave all parties roughly equally unhappy.
The harder question is why has it taken so long to get to a point that was predictable from the start?
The eventual return to negotiations was always the most likely end state. The last round of pre-war talks took place in Geneva on February 26. Many American specialists on Iran, including those within the Trump administration, European partners and Gulf allies repeatedly argued that diplomacy, however frustrating, offered the only realistic path to a lasting outcome.
Instead, the White House – contrary to one of the most fundamental principles of successful warfare, as defined by Clausewitz – began a conflict without clearly defining its objectives. At various points, the US appeared to pursue regime change, deterrence, military degradation, and coercive diplomacy simultaneously. Somewhat strangely, at one point the main objective of the US military campaign seemed to be the rescue of a downed plane over Iran. These are distinct goals that require different strategies. The lack of clarity created confusion not only among allies but also within the administration itself.
This confusion was compounded by an ingrained tendency to discount expert advice. Warnings from regional partners and European governments closely allied with embassies in Tehran (unlike the US) were often ignored. More importantly, Donald Trump appears to have accepted disingenuous assurances from the Israeli prime minister – not a disinterested party – that the Iranian regime could be destabilized and potentially removed within days. This assessment turned out to be deeply wrong.
As the conflict developed, the gap between military success and political achievement became increasingly apparent. The US and Israel were able to strike targets across Iran almost at will. But the military operations did not bring about the predicted political collapse. Instead, they created a protracted confrontation characterized by economic disruption, attacks on shipping, and growing international concern.
The war also produced unintended consequences, which have largely benefited the Iranian position. These are “pluses” in any new deal. Especially, a young one in fact Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz, and Tehran is able to demand not only that the US cease attacks on Iran, but also that Israel be restrained in Lebanon. Both would have been judged unreliable before the war.
The White House also struggled to adapt when its initial assumptions turned out to be incorrect. Effective wartime leadership requires not only a clear objective but also the political resolve to pursue it through unexpected developments and obstacles. President Trump often vacillated between escalation and de-escalation. Public statements often contradicted each other. There was talk of overwhelming force – for example, a ludicrous promise to return Iranian civilization (the source of much Western civilization, by the way) to the Stone Age. This was quickly followed by calls for negotiations and the declaration of victory (without evidence). The result was uncertainty among allies, adversaries, and markets alike. Seldom in the history of human conflict has so much been said to so little coherent effect.
The economic consequences extended far beyond Iran. The naval blockades imposed by Iran and the US, in turn, imposed huge costs on the global economy through higher energy prices, fertilizer shortages, and renewed inflationary pressures. Iran’s economy is under great pressure – a pain that is borne by ordinary citizens, not the ruling elite. But it has not yet softened, and sanctions, a blunt instrument at the best of times, tend not to produce the decisive results promised by their advocates.
None of this should overshadow the importance of this week’s deal. Diplomacy is returning because the US and Iran have recognized the limitations of military force. The challenge now is to turn an initial agreement into a comprehensive solution.
However, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that this conflict could have been avoided altogether. Had the negotiations continued beyond the last round of talks that took place in Geneva on February 26, Washington could have secured a more favorable outcome at a much lower cost. The concessions now likely to be part of a final settlement appear greater than those previously discussed. They could include a greater Iranian role in deals related to the Strait of Hormuz and tighter restrictions on Israel’s freedom of action against Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Three months of conflict, therefore, have turned the parties towards a destination that was obvious from the beginning. The difference is that thousands have died, the regime in Tehran is tougher and less predictable than the previous one, regional stability has been damaged, and the eventual deal is likely to be less favorable than what could have been achieved through uninterrupted diplomacy. This is not a victory. It’s a valuable lesson in the importance of setting realistic objectives before starting a fight. What we have now is a conflict declared over without being fully resolved, a victory declared without being defined.
And so—with apologies to poetry purists for the poor scan—the first stanza of that old nursery rhyme invites revision:
Oh, President Trump,
He had ten thousand marines,
He sailed them to the Strait of Hormuz –
And sailed them home again.
When they arose, they arose,
And when they were down, they were down,
And when they were only half way,
They were neither up nor down.
(Further reading: Why is America still talking about Kamala Harris?)
