China’s construction of what could be the world’s largest naval replenishment ship signals its growing expeditionary ambitions — and highlights the vulnerability of the U.S. base-dependent power projection model.
This month, multiple times MEDIA points of sale reported that satellite images and state media show that a state-owned subsidiary of the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) has been rapidly building what appears to be the world’s largest naval replenishment vessel on Longxue Island, near Guangzhou, China, since at least February 2026.
Measuring approximately 270 meters long with a beam of 37 meters, the scaled fleet auxiliary ship significantly outsizes China’s current 45,000-ton Type 901 replenishment ship and the US Navy’s newest John Lewis-class oil tankers.
With a wide, slab-sided hull optimized for volume, the ship includes double-span hangars and a stern flight deck to facilitate vertical helicopter refueling, as well as vertical pylon-like structures amidships designed to transfer fuel, ammunition and dry stores at sea.
This massive logistics asset appears designed to support the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) expanding strike groups, including conventionally powered aircraft carriers like the Fujian and advanced amphibious ships like the Type 076, during extended blue-water operations away from mainland ports.
The ship’s rapid assembly underscores a growing disparity between Chinese and U.S. naval shipbuilding capabilities, providing China with the critical logistical capability needed to project naval power across the Pacific and globally without relying on foreign coastal infrastructure.
For a major military power, it may be surprising that China has only one foreign military base in Djibouti, compared to the US. which has about 750 bases worldwide.
As such, China’s power projection efforts have been relatively limited by its lack of foreign bases, forcing it to rely on an extended supply chain of vulnerable auxiliary vessels for such missions.
Although China has an extensive network of dual-use infrastructure associated with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is primarily framed as economic, it can also support PLA operations around the world. Facilities such as Gwadar, Hambantota, Kyaukpyu and Honiara could enable China to project power into the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.
From a military perspective, these isolated facilities are vulnerable and difficult to defend. Furthermore, political instability in BRI host countries threatens their long-term sustainability.
China’s logistical constraints may become more pronounced if its fourth carrier – widely speculated to be nuclear powered – enters service. Nuclear propulsion could give the carrier itself incredible endurance, but its aircraft, escorts, crew and weapons would still require replenishment.
In line with these limitations, China’s new naval replenishment ship can, to some extent, but not completely, mitigate the weaknesses resulting from the lack of foreign core capabilities.
The massive boost could indicate that China is developing a more self-sufficient expeditionary capability, potentially reducing its reliance on the overseas core network at the heart of US power projection.
During World War II, before the US had its global network of bases, it had true expeditionary capability, meaning it could project power from its continent without depending on foreign bases.
As the US consolidated its global network of military bases, the US Navy likely became one “garrison force” – one that depended on access to foreign bases for power projection.
By the end of the Cold War, US bases were supposed to be shelters against attack and to enable unhindered assembly and deployment of forces.
The protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan also reinforced the idea that coalition building and foreign basing were more viable means of power projection than maintaining independent capabilities for that purpose.
However, these assumptions have now been seriously challenged. China has developed long-range missiles such as the DF-21 and DF-26 that could threaten US air and naval bases in the Pacific.
Recent fighting in the Middle East offers a warning of what happens when supposedly secure forward bases come under sustained missile and drone attacks.
Iran’s ongoing war has seen Iranian missiles and drones leave many of them 13 regional bases used by US troops, but uninhabitabledestroy costly military equipment and cause casualties.
The Iran war may have forced regional US allies to ask hard questions about the strategic value of US bases in the region and the reliability of US security guarantees. They will now have to face the hard reality of Iran’s geographic advantage in the Strait of Hormuz and an entrenched regime that may now have every reason to advance nuclear weapons development.
However, it is very likely that the US will remain in the Middle East, but its regional footprint may change significantly after the conflict. Strategic bases, such as the US 5th Fleet Headquarters in Bahrain and Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, could remain, as withdrawal from these facilities could have serious strategic consequences for US interests.
Smaller US bases near Iran, many of which proved vulnerable to Iranian drone and missile attacks, could be closed. In parallel, the US could explore new basing options, perhaps in Israel or Jordan.
But what do these lessons mean for the posture of American forces in the Pacific? Major hubs like Guam and Okinawa are critical anchors of the US presence in the region, but they are increasingly vulnerable to attack. Smaller US “lily pad” facilities on remote Pacific islands may also face similar vulnerabilities.
China’s growing economic and political influence in the region, along with military overmatch against regional states, may prompt economically constrained, politically sensitive, and militarily vulnerable US allies and partners to think twice about hosting US forces.
Faced with a potentially degraded Pacific base position, the US may have to rely more on power projection from the US mainland, as it did during World War II.
In terms of air power, this could mean increased reliance on hypersonic weapons, strategic bombers and tanker aircraft based on the US mainland for interdiction strikes.
At sea, the US may have to relearn how to use the oceans themselves as a base of operations. This may mean re-exploring the sea-basing concept, which uses the sea itself as a base for power projection rather than relying on potentially vulnerable bases and uncertain allies.
While the US Navy maintains formidable strike capabilities, it must also ensure that it can stay in the fight after the initial strikes have been fired.
This would entail significant reinvestment in neglected skills, such as Naval Base Vessels and other Replenishment at Sea (RAS) assets.which would enable the US Navy to last longer in a possible war in the Pacific and reduce dependence on potentially vulnerable and politically unreliable foreign bases.
Therefore, China’s development of what could be the world’s largest replenishment ship could signal its increasingly ambitious blue water ambitions as it addresses a lack of foreign basing options.
It could also serve as a mirror warning to the US, prompting a reexamination of its long-held assumptions about power projection and a reassessment of how it envisions a future conflict in the Pacific – one in which it could neither use its regional bases nor depend on its allies.
