Sometimes new government strategies are not really worth it. of National Defense Strategy 2026 (NDS) is like that.
The biggest headline from the document is additional defense spending of A$53 billion (US$38 billion) over the next decade, which the government claims (with some accounting trickery) will amount to 3% of GDP.
While this technically meets US President Donald Trump’s demands that America’s allies in NATO and elsewhere spend more on their militaries, there more about it that’s it. In particular, NATO’s measures are based on the amount of cash that is spent each year, rather than on future expenditures set out in long-term plans.
In terms of the actual strategy, however, the main step seems rather muted: there has been “significant progress in the implementation of the National Defense Strategy 2024”. This is reassuring, but of course that was the purpose of that earlier document – to implement.
Being a heated version of strategy 2024the 2026 document seems to ignore what has happened since then – and it has been considerable.
Over the past two years, there has been a worsening war in Ukraine, a widening conflict in the Middle East that has engulfed the entire region and sent shockwaves through the global economy, and many unpredictable American military adventures.
At times, the strategy seems backward to a bygone era, lacking courage and confidence.
What does the strategy promise?
The 2026 NDS keeps Australia’s in place denial strategythat is, a defensive strategy aimed at preventing an adversary from taking military action against Australia.
Although defense funding has increased somewhat, we are likely to see higher inflation as a result of the US-Israel war against Iran. Planned allocations for operating and manning current Australian Defense Force (ADF) ships, aircraft and vehicles are unlikely to be sufficient.
The money to make up for this shortfall may mean that less is spent than planned on purchasing new equipment. What matters is what you get for your money, not how much you spend. However, there are two notable investments mentioned in the strategy, even if they are relatively small compared to many other defense projects.
ADF finally will get one medium range surface-to-air missile system capable of shooting down incoming ballistic missiles. Such threats may once have seemed remote, but missile attacks have become routine. In the last year, ballistic missiles have been launched by Russia, Iran and the Houthis in Yemen.
However, the ADF’s missile defenses probably won’t enter service for several years, as other countries are already in shopping queue ahead of Australia.
ADF will also receive a range of unmanned autonomous systems (air and water drones), such as those of the Air Force Ghost naked and the Navy The ghost shark AND Spear tooth. And in a boost to our national resilience, these are made in Australia even if some of the parts are imported.
The recent wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have had emphasized the importance of these systems, the strategy emphasizes. And it adds, the future of warfare will include both autonomous unmanned systems and artificial intelligence (AI).
Disappointingly, however, compared to the huge expenditure on traditional manned ships, submarines and armored vehicles, not much has been allocated to these systems or the AI wave of the future.
Where else is it missing?
Because this is a continuing document, it misses an important opportunity to convince an increasingly skeptical public of the wisdom of the extremely expensive purchases of nuclear submarines under the AUKUS program.
Dennis Richardson, a former secretary of the Department of Defense, recently argued these ships “are of value only if they are a net addition to defensive capability”. The implication is that subs are nice to have, but not essential, unlike other gear.
The 2026 NDS could have placed the submarines in a coherent strategic framework, along with the rest of defense, and provided a clear and compelling rationale for their acquisition. Or, as they say in defense, they speak: a strategic narrative. It didn’t happen.
The absence of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, who is in Asia to secure fuel shipments to Australia, from the strategy launch highlights another major omission.
The title of the strategy includes the word “national”, but the nation is missing from it. This document, and the previous NDS, rightly state that Australia’s defense involves a whole-of-nation approach that goes beyond just the defense forces. But how this approach is meant to work is only briefly noted.
The current fuel crisis suggests that there is much to be done. Spending money on military equipment may be pointless if there is not enough fuel to use it. This became clear in 2018 when there was apparently a major air exercise in Darwin discontinued due to the delay of a tanker from Singapore.
The NDS notes the investments Defense has made in recent years to improve fuel security to address shortages. It has been testing low-carbon, sustainable aviation fuels, but has no plans yet to produce them on a large scale for military use.
So far, it seems Defense is just pushing the edges of security and fuel resilience.
A changed America
Finally, there is an elephant in the room: the Americans.
One can sympathize with the government wanting to keep a low profile when it comes to Australia’s main alliance partner. However, this alliance in an increasingly unstable world is of great importance.
Earlier this year, the US released its own National Defense Strategy that called on regional allies to help protect the “first island chain,” which runs from the Philippines to Taiwan to the Japanese islands.
Through this America First, common sense lens, America’s alliances and partners have an essential role to play—but not as the dependencies of the last generation. (…) For too long, allies and partners have been content to let us subsidize their defense.
Australia’s NDS discusses the alliance in pre-Trump language of shared strategic interests, with only a nod to the importance of “maintaining Australian sovereignty and increasing our self-reliance”.
The 2026 NDS was supposed to explain where an untrustworthy and undisciplined America does or does not fit into Australian defense thinking.
Peter Layton is visiting colleagues, strategic studies, Griffith University
This article was reprinted from Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read on original article.
