As the war in the Middle East enters its third week, there is no sign from either Iran or the United States and Israel that they will stop fighting anytime soon. It is becoming more violent and evil by the day.
The Iranian Islamic regime is fighting for its survival, while the US and Israel want to degrade or fundamentally destroy it.
The Iranian side lacks the firepower of the US and Israel, but has proved more resilient than its opponents might have expected. It has decided to fight as long as possible and inflict as much economic pain regionally and globally as necessary.
So where do things go from here? What do the US and Israel want to achieve in the war and how might it end?
Trump’s incoherent objectives
The US and Israel launched this “chosen war” against Iran on February 28. Trump apparently expected that formidable US air and sea power, as well as Israeli air power, would quickly prevail.
At a minimum, Trump was predicting that the Iranian regime would then accept his demand for a favorable nuclear deal. But he was also hinting at broader goals tied to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s goals — to force Iran to give up its long-range ballistic missiles and sever ties with regional proxies.
This would then pave the way for Iran’s restless population to resume their protests, aiming to topple the regime and replace it with one acceptable to Washington and Jerusalem.
But this did not happen. It is now abundantly clear that the US and Israel started a war without a clear goal, strategy, timeline, conclusion or justification. There was also no respect for international law.
The Trump administration’s goals have been confusing and contradictory, with different narratives being conveyed by the president and his top advisers.
They have included everything from freeing the oppressed Iranian people to removing a direct threat to America and destroying Iran’s nuclear program and missile capability. (Never mind Trump previously claimed (he had “wiped out” Iran’s nuclear program in last year’s bombing campaign.)
Trump has also called for regime change, or as he put it, “a little excursion” to get rid of “some bad leaders”.
Trump has further claimed that the human and economic cost of the war – including worldwide oil and gas shortages – will be temporary. But when the fighting will stop is anyone’s guess. Trump has insisted the war is already wonthen said it will only end when he feels it in his “bones”.
Meanwhile, the US has intensified its aerial bombardment of Iran, claiming to have struck 15,000 targets AND destroyed every military facility on Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf, the main terminal for exporting 90% of the country’s oil.
Trump is now said to be considering sending US forces to conquer the islandwhile inviting US allies, as well as China, to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz to oil shipments.
Inviting China into such a coalition is a fantastic idea – it has good relations with Iran. Most other countries have done it by now refused to engage.
A clear target of Israel
While Trump’s intentions seem to change by the minute, Netanyahu has a clearer war target. He wants to destroy not only the Islamic regime, but also to diminish the Iranian state, regardless of the consequences for the Iranian people and territorial integrity.
Recently he has also been vocal about his ambition for a biblical notion of “Great Israel“, based on the Book of Genesis, stretching from the Euphrates River to the Nile River. US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee, supported him about it in a recent interview with Tucker Carlson.
Although Netanyahu has been widely condemned for expressing these ambitions, he has not backed away from them.
Meanwhile, Israel also has alone sent troops in southern Lebanon for what it calls “limited and targeted ground operations” against Hezbollah, though many fear it could lead to a prolonged occupation.
says Israel’s defense minister residents will not be allowed to return until the security of northern Israel is ensured.
Iran’s strategy: hold on
Whatever the Iranian regime’s point of view, it has been more goal-oriented and strategic than its opponents. It has also shown a remarkable degree of embedding and persistence.
The regime quickly replaced the slain supreme leader with his son, Mojtaba Khameneialthough he has yet to be seen in public.
Despite all the internal and external pressure the regime is facing, members of its heavily armed and well-structured security and bureaucratic apparatus have remained loyal.
And why thousands joined the protests in the streets against the regime before it was toppled in January, other Iranians have rallied behind the regime. Many Iranians have historically been motivated to support the regime against external aggression, due to civilizational pride, the Shiite tradition of martyrdom, and a strong sense of nationalism.
On the battlefield, the regime is pursuing an asymmetric warfare strategy, aiming to outflank the US and Israel and inflict as much damage as possible.
That means turning the war into a regional conflict to pressure Arab states in the Persian Gulf to push the Trump administration to end the war — and perhaps reconsider their support of the US as a security provider.
The regime has managed to stay so far, and refused any negotiations.
Two possible outcomes
As things stand now, the stage is set for a long, bloody and devastating war. Each of the protagonists is painted into a corner and does not know how to get out.
There are two possible ways the fight could end. The first is focused on hardware. Whichever side depletes its reserves missiles and interceptors it may first signal a desire to end the fighting.
The second possibility is for Trump to claim that he has sufficiently degraded the regime and declare some kind of victory. He has already hinted at this, considering domestic opposition to the war (including some of his influential MAGA supporters), the rising economic costs of the war, and the looming mid-term elections.
If this happens, the Islamic regime will also claim victory, since it has held and remains intact.
Whatever the outcome, Iranian and Lebanese civilians would have borne the brunt of this war, and the region will enter another historic phase of uncertainty and instability in a highly polarized world.
Amin Saikal is professor emeritus of Middle Eastern studies, Australian National University; University of Western Australia; Victoria University
This article was reprinted from Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read on original article.
