April 7 started with Donald Trump issuing genocidal threats against Iran in social media and ended – just ten hours later – with the announcement of a 14-day ceasefire, on Iran’s terms. Even by the volatile standards of the Trump presidency, the whiplash is extraordinary. So what have the two sides agreed to—and what might that mean?
In a subsequent tweet, Trump claimed that Iran had agreed to keep the Strait of Hormuz open during the two-week pause in hostilities. Negotiations, he added, would continue during that period based on Iran’s 10-point plan, which he described as a “viable” basis for talks.
These 10 points are:
1. The US must fundamentally commit to guaranteeing non-aggression.
2. Iran’s continued control over the Strait of Hormuz.
3. Admitting that Iran can enrich uranium for its nuclear program
4. Removal of all primaries sanctions it is Iran.
5. Removal of all secondary sanctions against foreign entities doing business with Iranian institutions.
6. The end of it all United Nations Security Council resolutions targeting Iran.
7. End all International Atomic Energy Agency resolutions on Iran’s nuclear program.
8. Payment of compensation to Iran for war damages.
9. Withdrawal of US military forces from the region.
10. The truce on all fronts, including Israel’s conflict with Hezbollah IN Lebanon.
of United States of course he did not sign all ten points. But the mere fact that the Iran framework will anchor the negotiations constitutes an important diplomatic victory for Tehran.
More surprising still, according to Associated PressIran will retain control of the strait during the ceasefire and will continue – alongside Oman – to collect transit fees from passing ships. In fact, Washington appears to have accepted that reopening the waterway comes with tacit recognition of Iran’s authority over it.
The geopolitical consequences could be profound. As Muhamed Eslami and Zejneb Malakouti point out State responsibilityTehran is likely to use this position to rebuild economic ties with Asian and European partners – countries that once traded extensively with Iran but were driven out of its market over the past 15 years by US sanctions.
Iran’s reckoning is not just driven by solidarity with Palestinians and Lebanese. It is also strategic. Continued Israeli bombardment risks rekindling direct confrontation between Israel and Iran – a cycle that has already flared twice since October 7.
From Tehran’s perspective, a lasting end to its conflict with Israel is inseparable from ending Israel’s wars in Gaza and Lebanon. This is not an aspirational add-on; it is a prerequisite.
Upcoming talks in Islamabad between Washington and Tehran may still stall. But the terrain has changed. Trump’s failed use of force has eroded the credibility of US military threats, introducing a new dynamic to US-Iran diplomacy.
Washington can still swing his sword. But after a failed war, such threats ring hollow. The United States is no longer able to dictate terms; any agreement will have to rest on a genuine compromise.
That, in turn, requires real diplomacy — patience, discipline and a tolerance for ambiguity — qualities not usually associated with Trump. It may also require the participation of other major powers, particularly China, to help anchor the process and reduce the risk of a return to conflict.
Above all, the durability of the ceasefire will depend on whether Trump can stop Israel from undermining the diplomatic channel. At this point, there should be no illusions. Senior Israeli officials have already denounced the deal as the largest.political disaster” in the country’s history – a signal, if any were needed, of how fragile this moment can be.
Even if the talks fail—and even if Israel resumes its bombing of Iran—it does not necessarily mean that the United States will return to war.
There is little reason to believe that a second round would produce a different result, or that it would not once again leave Iran in a position to hold the global economy hostage. In this sense, Tehran has, at least for now, restored a measure of deterrence.
One final point should be made: this election war was not just a strategic mistake. Rather than hastening regime change, it may have given Iran’s theocracy a renewed lease on life—much like Saddam Hussein it did in 1980, when its invasion enabled Ayatollah Khomeini to consolidate power in the country.
The magnitude of this miscalculation may trouble historians for decades to come.
This part appeared for the first time on Trita Parsi’s Substack page. It is reprinted here under a Shared dreams Creative Commons license.
