Iran may be where the US-led world order ends


In his monumental work The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire’, historian Edward Gibbon argued that empires rarely collapse suddenly. Their decline is usually gradual, shaped by long-term structural changes.

However, history occasionally records moments when a strategic miscalculation accelerates the process. The question worth asking is whether the United States may have come close to such a moment.

The joint US-Israel strike against Iran in February 2026 has sparked intense debate among scholars and policy observers. Military conflicts in West Asia are not uncommon, but this particular episode could have ramifications far beyond the battlefield. Some analysts have drawn parallels with 1956 Suez Crisiswhen Britain and France tried to seize the Suez Canal after Egypt nationalized it.

Although the operation was initially successful militarily, it failed politically after the US forced its European allies to withdraw. The crisis revealed that Britain could no longer act as an independent global power and symbolized the end of its imperial dominance.

Today, Iran’s attack may represent a comparable geopolitical turning point. For more than seven decades, the US has anchored the global order, not only through military might, but also through the institutions, rules, and economic arrangements that have structured the post-World War II international system. Many countries, including emerging powers, expanded economically within this framework.

China’s rise as a manufacturing powerhouse and Russia’s growing integration into global markets occurred largely within an economic system shaped by American leadership. Therefore, the legitimacy of US leadership rested not only on strength, but also on the perception that the system it created produced stability and shared economic benefits. Nowhere was this arrangement more strategically important than in West Asia.

Foundations of American leadership in West Asia

West Asia has long been one of the most volatile regions in global politics. Since the creation of Israel in 1948, recurring conflicts between Israel and Arab statesalong with sectarian rivalries and civil wars, have produced ongoing instability. However, the region also possesses large oil reserves, making its political stability essential to the functioning of the global economy.

To manage this strategic environment, the US developed a security and energy framework that became central to its global influence. Beginning in the 1970s, Washington offered security guarantees to Gulf monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.

In return, these countries agreed to price and trade oil primarily in US dollars. This agreement, commonly known as the petrodollar systemreinforced the US dollar’s central role in global finance by ensuring reliable energy supplies.

The relationship worked as a strategic bargain. The Gulf States received security protection in a region characterized by geopolitical rivalry, while the United States provided both energy stability and financial influence.

Over time, this agreement helped economic development across the Gulf and strengthened Washington’s position as the main external power shaping regional security.

Iran, however, has long remained outside this system. After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, relations between Tehran and Washington deteriorated significantly. Iran positioned itself as a challenger to US influence and developed networks of regional alliances with actors such as Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis. These relations deepened tensions across the region and reinforced the Gulf monarchies’ reliance on US security guarantees.

For decades, American strategy in West Asia rested on three pillars: containing Iran, preserving the petrodollar system, and guaranteeing the security of its Gulf partners. This framework allowed Washington to shape regional dynamics while maintaining its broader global leadership.

Why the regional order may be broken

However, recent developments suggest that the foundations of this system are weakening. The February 2026 attack on Iran has raised serious questions about both the credibility and sustainability of American leadership in the region.

A major concern is related to diplomatic trust. Reports indicate that negotiations between the US and Iran were ongoing in Oman when the first attack occurred. Launching a military attack during diplomatic engagement risks undermining confidence in the negotiation process. In international diplomacy, credibility remains an essential resource, even among strategic rivals.

The legitimacy of the operation has also been widely debated. The attack reportedly lacked formal authorization from the US Congress and did not receive approval from the United Nations Security Council. Actions that bypass established international mechanisms inevitably raise questions about the rules governing the use of force and the sustainability of the international order.

More importantly, the regional fallout has highlighted growing vulnerabilities. Iran’s retaliatory actions have targeted infrastructure and strategic locations linked to the Gulf states. For these governments, the episode raises a fundamental question: If the US cannot protect them from regional escalation, can it still serve as a credible guarantor of security?

These concerns have developed gradually. In recent years, the Gulf states have increasingly diversified their strategic relations. China’s expanding economic presence in the region has created alternative partnerships that were previously limited. Through large-scale investment, infrastructure projects and energy cooperation, Beijing has steadily strengthened its position as a major economic actor in West Asia.

China has also begun to play a diplomatic role. The 2023 agreement to restore relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, facilitated by Beijing, showed that alternative diplomatic actors are emerging in a region historically dominated by US mediation.

At the same time, the economic consequences of the escalation of the conflict could extend far beyond the Middle East. Any disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow sea passage through which a significant portion of global oil shipments pass, would significantly increase energy prices. Oil prices exceeding $100 per barrel would generate inflationary pressures throughout the global economy, affecting both developed and emerging markets.

The broader concern is that the US risks undermining the very system that once sustained its leadership. The postwar order commanded legitimacy because it appeared to promote stability, predictable rules, and economic growth. If Washington is increasingly perceived as a destabilizing force rather than a stabilizing one, the credibility of this leadership may gradually erode.

This dynamic is already evident in the growing interest of many countries in diversifying their economic and financial systems. Initiatives within the BRICS grouping aimed at reducing reliance on US-dominated financial institutions reflect a broader search for alternatives to the existing order.

However, it would be premature to declare the end of American global leadership. The US remains the most powerful military actor in the world and continues to occupy a central position in global finance and technology. However, hegemonic systems rarely collapse suddenly. More often, they gradually weaken as confidence in the dominant power diminishes.

The debate over the February 2026 strike on Iran reflects precisely this uncertainty. If the credibility of US security guarantees continues to erode in regions that once anchored its influence, the global order may gradually shift toward a more multipolar structure. Emerging powers, regional actors and new economic coalitions will increasingly shape international politics.

Whether the events of 2026 will ultimately be a turning point remains uncertain. But history suggests that moments of strategic breakthrough can precipitate deeper transformations. For the US, the challenge will be whether it can adapt its leadership to a changing world – or risk witnessing the slow erosion and eventual passing of the very order it once built.

Kashif Hasan Khan is Dean of the School of Graduate Studies and Head of the Department of Economics at Paragon International University in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. He is a member of the editorial board Asian Journal of Economic Modelling (Scopus Q3) and associate editor of Crossroads of Social Research at Abu Dhabi University.



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