After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia endured a period of violent criminal lawlessness known as “The wild ’90s.” Organized crime grew, with gangs taking control of banks, factories and other lucrative markets. Contract killings, shootings and car bombs became part of urban life.
there are now he is afraid that the war in Ukraine will create a similar situation as members of the Russian army, as well as ex-convicts who have been forgiven in return for military service, return from the front lines.
A number of conditions allowed organized crime to flourish in the 1990s. Weak state institutions, economic turmoil, and massive privatization after the collapse of the Soviet Union created a governance vacuum in Russia.
As criminologist Federico Varese, of the University of Oxford, explains in his work, criminal groups intervened to ensure “Private Protection” in areas where the state was ineffective or absent. They offered services such as contract enforcement, debt recovery and physical business security.
Meanwhile, sociologist Vadim Volkov describes the rise of “Violent Entrepreneurs” who commodified obligation in an environment where legal institutions had largely collapsed. of Russia the homicide rate increased in this period. Between 1990 and 1994, it doubled to a peak of over 33 murders per 100,000 people.
This made Russia’s homicide rate among the highest in the world.
Contemporary Russia presents a different picture. After that of Vladimir Putin rise to power in 1999, the Russian state consolidated its authority. Putin quickly expanded the state security apparatus while reasserting control over criminal networks.
In many cases, organized crime has to integrate into governance systems, fulfilling the political or strategic interests of the state. For example, criminal networks have has facilitated the avoidance of sanctions transporting restricted goods through parallel trade routes and acquiring sanctioned technologies through intermediary networks in third countries.
Reinforcement of this transformation
The war in Ukraine is likely to reinforce this latest transformation. Expanded Western sanctions imposed since the start of the war have expanded the possibilities for illegal trade and smuggling networks. But the most important consequences arise from the social and security challenges associated with the large-scale military demobilization.
Since the full-scale invasion in 2022, Russia has mobilized hundreds of thousands of military personnel. This includes up to 180,000 former convict. Many of these people have experienced prolonged exposure to combat. Military service does not inherently lead to criminality, and it would be inaccurate to suggest that all returning veterans are likely to become criminals.
However, testimony from post-conflict societies such as Colombia, Sierra Leone, Cambodia and Bosnia-Herzegovina suggests that poorly managed demobilization can reshape criminal markets.
research on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration consistently shows that unemployment, psychological trauma and weak institutional support create opportunities for criminal groups to recruit ex-combatants.
Military service also teaches soldiers organizational skills beyond battlefield experience, such as logistics, intelligence gathering, and network management. These skills are all transferable to contemporary organized crime. In modern organized crime environments, traditional blackmail is complemented by cybercrime, cryptocurrency laundering and international financial crime.
Even if only a small fraction of military personnel returning from Ukraine engage in criminal activity, they can change the composition and improve the operational sophistication of Russian crime groups. While circumstances change, the case of Colombia illustrates how poorly managed demobilization can transform organized crime.
In the 2000s, over 30,000 fighters from right-wing paramilitary groups in Colombia were demobilized. A minority of these ex-combatants subsequently joined or founded criminal organizations. They provided military training, discipline and networks, aiding the capabilities of organized crime.
These groups quickly became major players in the Colombian organized crime ecosystem. A Human Rights Watch REPORT found that they became the main perpetrators of drug trafficking, extortion and violence. Estimates suggest they controlled up to half of Colombia’s cocaine exports by 2011.
The Russian state is much stronger than the one that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This makes a wholesale revival of traditional criminal violence impossible. Instead, The Ukrainian war looks set to usher in a new generation of criminal networks that are more professional, militarized and embedded within state structures.
However, the Kremlin still faces a difficult balancing act. Contemporary Russian governance has relied on the management and exploitation of criminal groups. AND Moscow seems cautious of the widespread social instability that would emerge if criminal organizations become powerful or autonomous enough to operate outside the control of the state.
Russia that’s how it started preparing plans for the return of veterans from Ukraine. The Kremlin has implemented initiatives such as “Time of Heroes” program. This program channels selected veterans into public administration and political office after their demobilization. Although limited, such planning reflects official recognition that the war’s domestic consequences will extend beyond the battlefield.
Despite these efforts, the distinction between organized crime and state power in Russia is likely to become more difficult to make than at any time since the end of the Cold War.
Adriana Marin is a professor of international relations, Coventry University
This article was reprinted from Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read on original article.
