This article originally appeared on Pacific Forum and is reprinted with permission. Read the original here.
Cable installation and repair capacity of KDDIJapan’s intervention in Machine Milling Machine purchase, and Daikin–Shin-Etsu–Hitachi–Tokyo Eco Recycle The rare earth magnet project seems to belong to separate worlds of politics. One is about digital infrastructure, another is industrial equipment, and another is materials recovery.
Together, they point to an infrastructure challenge that Japan must plan to overcome. Japan’s civilian industries and defense systems often depend on the same infrastructure, and when disruption occurs below the threshold of open conflict, Japan must be able to keep civilian functions operating while restoring the relevant defense systems.
Gray zone conflict is the environment Japan is most likely to face first. An undersea cable can be damaged without clear attribution, or a port or airport communications system can be disrupted by cyber operations.
Incidents like these cost time, money and manpower before officials can say whether the cause was accidental, criminal or coercive. As an archipelagic state, Japan cannot separate civilian infrastructure from defense readiness.
Tokyo has already accepted part of this challenge, but the framework remains incomplete. of Japan National Security Strategy identifies gray zone situations, cyber attacks on critical civilian infrastructure, and information warfare as pressures that blur the line between peacetime and emergency.
of The defense enhancement program it also addresses defense production and the technology base as part of defense capability, recognizing that advanced civilian technologies can shape future operations.
The last one fiscal year 2026 defense materials apply this logic to public infrastructure by designating selected airports and seaports for smoother use by the Japan Self-Defense Forces and Japan Coast Guard, with road access to SDF bases added to the initiative from fiscal year 2025. These are important steps, but the designation is only the beginning.
What Tokyo must now decide is which civilian systems are most exposed to gray-zone disruptions, and which failures will most quickly permeate both defense operations and civilian life. Japan cannot strengthen every port, cable, supplier, road, airport, cloud system and industrial firm equally.
In a gray area environment, priority must be given to systems that must continue to operate before Tokyo has all the information required for a decision. If an airport transportation system is hacked, a port operating platform is compromised, or fuel logistics are disrupted, local authorities and private operators cannot freeze until attribution is clear.
The same problem of access extends offshore. Japan is a major Indo-Pacific cable hub. or CSIS The report notes that Japan has more than 20 international submarine cable landing stations and about 30 active or announced international cable systems.
These cables give Japan digital prominence, but they also create a problem of physical durability. A damaged cable must be reached by a ship, handled by trained crews and restored through arrangements that often land in private or commercial hands.
Japan has domestic strength in this area. KDDI Infinity Cable works for the construction and repair of domestic and international telecommunication submarine cables. A cable break may initially appear as a commercial repair problem rather than a national security incident. This makes cable resilience part of Japan’s broader access challenge, rather than an isolated telecommunications issue.
Access and connectivity could allow Japan to keep moving through the early phase of disruption. Recovery then depends on industrial capacity to repair what has been damaged.
A compromised logistics platform, delayed movement of spare parts, limited port access, or uncertainty about contractor responsibilities can create adverse operational effects without producing a clear military confrontation.
Japan’s intervention in MBK Partners’ proposed acquisition of Machine Milling Machine further illustrates a shift in how Tokyo views its broader defense apparatus. The case shows a broader picture of the defense-adjacent industry, where companies outside the traditional defense sector can still become important to national security.
SETTLING lists machine tools and industrial robots among Japan’s specified critical products, alongside permanent magnets, aircraft parts, semiconductors, storage batteries, cloud software, natural gas, critical minerals and ship parts. Firms and inputs that support defense capability often reside in mainstream industrial systems before appearing in security planning.
Material supply also matters because sustainability also depends on what Japan can recover from its civilian economy. Rare earth magnet recycling project involving Daikin, Shin-Etsu Chemical, Hitachi and Tokyo Eco Recycle provides a new route for material recovery.
These companies are developing a system to recover rare earth magnets from commercial air conditioner compressors and turn them into magnet manufacturing. This further illustrates the link between civilian trade networks and defense industrial needs.
All of this shows that Tokyo cannot treat gray area resilience as just a traditional defense and industry problem. A crisis below the threshold of open conflict may affect civilian infrastructure before it reaches systems normally classified as defense. This makes ports, cables, repair capacity and material recovery part of the operational environment.
Tokyo has taken significant steps within individual sectors, but the gray area disruption will cut across them. A holistic framework must be built from these existing policy decisions and link civilian infrastructure and commercial firms with Japan’s defense-industrial needs.
Two concrete steps would help. First, Japan must design its defense chains for ambiguous disruptions rather than pure wartime scenarios. The map should show where the same authorities, repair assets, emergency clearances, communication systems and logistics providers would be needed from more than one system at the same time.
It should also identify what actions can be initiated before the attribution of the disruption is clearly established. This may include protocols for rerouting loads, maintaining backup communications, authorizing repair access for dual-use infrastructure, and coordinating public-private actions during outages.
Second, public support for defense-adjacent industries should include crisis roles that can be activated before blame is assigned. Firms throughout the defense-adjacent industrial base need to know what they are expected to do when normal business systems are disrupted. Waiting for the attribute allows the operational interruption to propagate more time. This should include two layers of preparation.
For the public, Japan should prepare clear guidelines on how residents and businesses should respond during infrastructure disruptions, where official information will come from, and which services may be changed or temporarily limited.
For industry and government, the protocol needs to be more functional: who contacts whom, who can authorize actions, what can proceed according to commercial procedures, and when a disruption goes up a defense or interagency chain of command.
Japan must also address this as a regional agenda, because the disruption of the gray zone will not stop at Japan’s coastline. Submarine cables and other infrastructures that traverse international space require predetermined repair processes before a crisis occurs.
Japan and its partners need stable agreements that allow operators, ships and authorities to move quickly across jurisdictions without turning every scenario into a new diplomatic negotiation.
A particular focus should be whether private industry can carry out repairs under commercial procedures or whether some disruptions would require more traditional defense arrangements between militaries.
Japan’s geography makes this work inevitable. The most likely tests may come through ambiguous interruptions rather than open conflict. Tokyo’s ability to quickly repair these disruptions will determine whether the gray zone pressure remains manageable or spills over into a wider crisis.
Christian Cerne (christian@pacforum.org) is a research intern at the Pacific Forum and a master’s candidate in International and Development Studies at the Graduate Institute of Geneva. His work focuses on strategic resource diplomacy and economic security in the Asia-Pacific.
