The decision of the European Union to host a Taliban delegation in Brussels on 23 June marked an important moment in the developing relationship between Europe and Afghanistan’s de facto rulers.
While European officials stressed that the talks were technical and did not imply diplomatic recognition, the meeting nevertheless represented the first EU-organized engagement with Taliban representatives on European soil since the movement returned to power in August 2021, following the US military withdrawal.
Led by The spokesman for the Taliban’s Foreign Ministry, Abdul Qahar Balkhithe five-member delegation met EU officials and representatives of several member states for discussions focused on migration, consular issues and the return of Afghan nationals whose asylum claims have been rejected.
According to Balkhi, the talks also addressed the restoration of broader consular services for Afghans living in Europeconfidence-building measures and what he described as a “dignified return process” for Afghan nationals.
Belgian officials stressed that the facilitation of the visit reflected Belgium’s obligations as host of EU institutions and should not be interpreted as political recognition of the Taliban government.
The members of the delegation were visas with limited territorial validity are issuedand the meeting took place away from official EU premises, underscoring the sensitivity surrounding the talks.
No major agreement came out of the meeting. However, the discussions highlighted a central dilemma for European policymakers: how to engage Afghanistan’s de facto authorities by keeping pressure on security, governance and human rights issues.
The shadow of Doha
The Brussels talks took place against the backdrop of Doha Agreement 2020which shaped international expectations regarding the Taliban during the final phase of Western military presence in Afghanistan.
Under the agreement, the Taliban committed to preventing the use of Afghan territory against other states, denying shelter to terrorist organizations and supporting a political process that would lead to a more inclusive political order.
Nearly six years later, many governments argue that key Taliban commitments remain unfulfilled. Political power remains concentrated within The leadership structures of the Talibanwhile significant political involvement has not yet emerged.
Questions about counterterrorism engagements have proven particularly relevant. The killing of the leader of Al-Qaeda Ayman al-Zawahiri in a Taliban-controlled area of Kabul in August 2022 raised serious concerns about assurances that Afghan territory would not serve as a sanctuary for international militant actors.
Later reviews from United Nations Security Council Monitoring TeamUS Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction and regional security organizations have continued to identify Afghanistan as a enabling environment for numerous extremist groups.
These include Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province, Al-Qaeda, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and Jamaat Ansarullah.
UN monitoring reports continue to identify more than 20 militant organizations operating in Afghanistan, undermining the Taliban’s claims that it has fulfilled its counterterrorism commitments.
Why is Europe swaying?
Proponents of engagement argue that practical cooperation with Afghanistan’s de facto authorities has become increasingly difficult to avoid. The Taliban control the institutions responsible for border management, migration procedures and access for international organizations operating inside the country.
Some European governments are facing growing domestic pressure to tighten migration policies and improve the return of individuals whose asylum applications have been rejected.
Afghans remain among the largest groups seeking asylum within the European Union, making migration a politically sensitive issue in much of the continent. The meeting also revealed the internal pressures that shape European politics.
European Commission officials said the contacts followed requests from member states seeking stronger cooperation on migration and returns.
A majority of EU governments have supported calls for tougher migration policies, reflecting broader concerns over border management and public pressure to increase deportations of individuals whose claims are rejected.
In this context, contact with the Taliban authorities is seen less as support than as an attempt to address a practical policy challenge. Any attempt to facilitate returns inevitably requires communication with the authorities controlling Afghanistan’s borders and administrative institutions.
Regional powers, including Russia, China, India and some Central Asian countrieshave expanded contacts with the Taliban, reducing Afghanistan’s international isolation and complicating Europe’s calculations.
Advocates of dialogue argue that limited engagement can provide opportunities to raise concerns about migration, security and humanitarian issues while maintaining channels of communication.
Critics, however, warn that practical cooperation can gradually blur the distinction between commitment and legitimacy. The central policy challenge for Europe is therefore not whether communication should happen, but whether it can be structured around clear expectations and measurable outcomes.
Human rights and strategic credibility
The most controversial aspect of the Brussels meeting was not the migration policy itself, but the wider political environment in which it took place.
Since returning to power, the Taliban have imposed extensive restrictions on women and girls. More than 2.2 million Afghan girls remain excluded from secondary and higher education, while women face severe restrictions on employment, public participation and freedom of movement.
These policies have generated increasing legal and diplomatic scrutiny. Human rights organizationslegal scholars and some governments increasingly characterize the situation as gender persecution or even gender apartheid.
The meeting drew criticism from leading rights organisations. Human Rights Watch warned that cooperation on deportations is dangerous undermining human rights in Europe engagements and exposure of vulnerable Afghans to new risk.
Human Rights Watch researcher Fereshta Abbasi argued that European governments risk undermining their credibility by condemning Taliban abuses while at the same time pursuing cooperation on refugee returns.
Nobel Peace Prize laureate Malala Yousafzai similarly argued that any engagement with the Taliban should be judged through the lens of human rights. Afghan women and girlswarning against legitimizing a regime responsible for one of the world’s worst human rights crises.
Amnesty International also criticized efforts to expand deportation deals, arguing that Afghanistan remains unsafe for many returnees. International bodies continue to document allegations of arbitrary detention, restrictions on civil and media liberties, and other human rights violations.
The human rights dimension is directly intertwined with migration. Many of the factors driving Afghans to seek refuge abroad are related to the political, social and economic conditions that have emerged since the Taliban took power in 2021.
Afghanistan is also in the midst of a severe humanitarian crisis. According to international aid agencies, more than 17 million Afghans face acute food insecurity, while the country is simultaneously trying to absorb large numbers of returnees from neighboring Pakistan and Iran.
These challenges have been compounded by economic isolation, governance deficiencies and the return of millions of Afghans from neighboring countries over the past year.
The question of credibility
For the EU, the implications extend far beyond Afghanistan. The bloc has consistently presented itself as a defender of international law, human rights and rule-based governance. Thus, its approach to the Taliban will be evaluated not only from the point of view of policy effectiveness, but also through the lens of strategic credibility.
The Brussels meeting signals a new phase in Europe’s approach. The debate is no longer whether engagement with the Taliban should happen, but rather how it should be structured and under what conditions.
The success of Europe’s approach will depend on whether engagement remains tied to measurable standards on counter-terrorism, human rights and governance rather than evolving into normalization by default. Without clear conditions and verifiable progress, Europe risks expanding contacts while reducing its influence.
It remains to be seen whether the Brussels meeting will become a model for conditional engagement or the beginning of gradual normalization. How Europe manages that balance could shape not only its future relationship with Afghanistan, but also the credibility of its broader commitment to a values-based foreign policy.
Saima Afzal is a scholar specializing in South Asian security, counter-terrorism and wider geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East, Afghanistan and the Indo-Pacific. She is currently a research scholar at the Justus Liebig University, Germany.





