Warnings by US Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Tulsi Gabbard before the US Senate that Pakistan may be moving towards an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability are raising new concerns about potential threats to the US homeland.
In it TESTIMONY Before the US Senate, Gabbard stated that Pakistan is developing long-range ballistic missiles that “potentially could include ICBMs” capable of striking US territory, although she did not specify the timelines, locations or operational status.
Her testimony places Pakistan alongside China, Russia, North Korea and Iran as states developing nuclear or conventional missile delivery systems.
These developments are part of a broader trend that the intelligence community estimates could increase the number of missiles threatening the US to more than 16,000 by 2035, from more than 3,000 currently.
The assessment shows that such states are likely to study U.S. missile defense plans to shape their missile development and assess U.S. deterrence intentions, highlighting growing U.S. concern about expanding missile threats to the homeland. Gabbard’s warning that Pakistan may be developing ICBM capabilities raises the question of why a nuclear power centered on India would pursue such systems.
In terms of weapons, Hans Kristensen and other writers point to a September 2025 ITEM to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that Pakistan’s Shaheen-III medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), the long-range system it has tested, has a range of 2,750 kilometers, enough to target all of mainland India from launch sites in much of Pakistan south of Islamabad.
Kristensen and others note that the Shaheen-III may have been designed to do more than that, as its 2,750 kilometer range was dictated by the need to hit the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which India could develop as strategic bases to position its weapons. They also point out that for the Shaheen-III to reach the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, it would have to launch from the easternmost parts of Pakistan, close to the Indian border.
This suggests that Pakistan’s longer-range systems remain geared towards covering the full spectrum of Indian targets, including peripheral bases.
Additionally, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) RATINGS that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal was about 170 warheads as of January 2025. It notes that Pakistan continues to develop a nascent nuclear triad that includes aircraft, land-based ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).
SIPRI adds that the continued development of delivery systems and the accumulation of fissile material suggest that Pakistan’s arsenal could expand over the next decade, although projections vary due to limited publicly available data.
Given Pakistan’s position at the heart of India, it remains unclear why it would pursue ICBM capability despite modernizing its nuclear arsenal. As Timothy Wright writes in a February 2025 ITEM for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), available evidence points to emerging developments in Pakistan’s long-range missile capabilities, but remains inconclusive.
Wright cites US sanctions on Pakistan’s National Defense Complex and related Chinese suppliers of composite materials, filament winding machinery, mandrels and inspection systems associated with large solid rocket motors.
It also points to satellite images showing a new, larger horizontal engine test stand at Attock, built between 2021 and late 2023, suggesting the ability to test larger rocket engines, although their ultimate purpose remains unclear.
However, Pakistan may have ample reason to worry about US action against its nuclear arsenal. As noted by Chilamkuri Mohan in a December 2024 ITEM for the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore, during the US War in Afghanistan, the US downplayed Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation network, as Pakistan was a key partner in counter-terrorism efforts.
Mohan says these restrictions appear less important after the US pulls out of Afghanistan in 2021. He notes that as US and Israeli concerns about Iran’s nuclear development grow, there could be an increase in punitive actions against countries and groups that support Iran’s advancement.
The June 2025 US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities may have heightened nuclear anxieties in Pakistan. Marcus Andreopoulos notes in an October 2025 ITEM to the Royal Society for Asian Affairs (RSAA) that US attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities have raised anxieties in Pakistan, which could accelerate Pakistan’s long-range missile program and possible development of intercontinental capabilities.
It highlights China’s long-standing support for Pakistan’s missile and nuclear programs and notes that Pakistan’s growing dependence on China raises questions about its strategic autonomy amid rising US-China tensions.
At the same time, he argues that a more transactional US approach to Pakistan could reduce US willingness to confront or contain these developments, allowing them to proceed with limited opposition.
The ambiguity surrounding Pakistan’s missile development may also serve a secondary purpose: keeping the US as a stabilizing force. Siddhant Kishore debates in a November 2025 ITEM for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that Pakistan’s nuclear signaling is less about directly deterring India and more about manipulating the dynamics of the crisis to draw in the US as a deterrent.
He says this signaling is intended to create the perception of imminent nuclear escalation, thereby drawing US attention and prompting intervention. He notes that historically, US involvement has often pressured India to exercise restraint.
In this sense, Pakistan’s nuclear posture functions as a tool of third-party coercion to offset India’s conventional military advantage, with the deliberate cultivation of insecurity at the heart of the strategy. Pakistan’s potential move toward longer-range capabilities—though unproven—could reflect a gradual shift from purely India-centric deterrence to defense against US power.
