Following the last announcement that Australia will buy three submarines already in US service instead of two used submarines and one new, AUKUS has again dominated the headlines.
AUKUS is a defense capabilities agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Since it was announced in 2021, it has rarely been out of the news. But how much of what you’ve heard is true?
As a former Navy officer specializing in anti-submarine warfare, I am often asked the same questions about AUKUS. While I can’t cover everything in one article, here are the details behind some of the more common claims.
Why is Australia buying used submarines?
Australia has Collins-class submarines that entered service between 1996 and 2003. Work must now be done to replace them, but decades DELAYS and insufficient funding has left Australia with an aging fleet.
Although the Collins-class submarines will each undergo a multi-year maintenance period extending their lives, they will not last long enough. They will have to be dismantled before Australia can co-design, build and manufacture submarines here under AUKUS.
A stopgap solution is required. The acquisition of three Virginia-class submarines in 2032, 2035 and 2038 will ensure this and also give Australia the opportunity to begin operating nuclear-powered submarines.
Think of it as a “crawl, walk, run” approach. Virginia is the walking stage before we start building our nuclear powered submarines.
Purchasing submarines already in service reduces risk and complexity, avoids the challenges of introducing a new submarine, and removes the need for initial certification trials.
Is Australia getting a less capable submarine?
Not in any meaningful sense, although the third Virginia will be an older version than planned, so its sensors will probably be a little less capable.
Australia will now take three Block IV Virginia class submarines. These remain among more capable attack submarines in the world. They carry more than 20 torpedoes and 12 Tomahawk land attack missiles.
Much of the commentary this week has suggested that Australia has missed out on additional missile capacity because the submarines we are getting will not have “Virginia cargo module” – a new hull section that allows submarines to carry more missiles.
But this comment is incorrect. The submarine that Australia was expected to receive in 2038 never happened TARGET have that ability.
In the conflict, Australia would primarily use these submarines in an anti-submarine and anti-ship role. Ground attack missiles are not used for this and so the additional capacity is not essential. It is also the capability that the US has said it is is not willing to provide.
The main difference is that the third submarine will have fewer years of life left than a new boat. A Virginia-class submarine off the production line would normally have one 33-year-old life.
According to Senate estimates this week, the Australian Submarine Agency said each boat will have more than 20 years of life left when we receive them.
Claims these submarines would only have eight years of life do not stand up to scrutiny. The type of submarines Australia will receive are just beginning to enter service 2020.
Is Australia paying $368 billion for three used submarines?
The most commonly quoted figure for AUKUS is AU$368 billion ($255.3 billion). Although technically correct, this figure covers costs until 2055including infrastructure, manpower and maintenance costs for 31 years, plus the acquisition of Virginia-class submarines in Australia and the construction of our own submarines.
Of the total, about AU$244 billion is the projected cost, while the remaining AU$122.9 billion is a 50% contingency on top. This is money set aside to cover risks, cost increases and unforeseen problems. Most defense projects have 5-10% contingencies.
Department of Defense 2026 Integrated Investment Program The nation’s nuclear-powered submarines will cost between US$71 billion and US$96 billion over the next decade.
Against projected defense funding of about US$887 billion over the same period, this equates to about 8-11% of defense spending.
Can the US build enough submarines for Australia?
This is one of the most legitimate points of debate in the discussion. The US reduced the production rate of submarines after the Cold War. Since the year 2011it has set a goal of increasing its construction rate to two submarines a year. From 2016–19, an average of 1.9 boats per year.
According to US Congressional Research REPORT on the Virginia-class submarines, this build rate declined due to manpower issues during Covid and challenges related to the transition to building the new Block V submarine, which is 2,000 tons larger than the Block IV Virginia.
The US is investing billions of dollars at its submarine industrial base to address this issue.
IN MayChief of Naval Operations Admiral Daryl Caudle told Congress he expects Virginia-class production to reach two boats a year around 2032. He previously said the US would need to reach a production rate of 2.3 to meet its 2054 goal, including selling three Virginias to Australia. The US is currently building 1.3 per year.
The challenges to the US submarine industrial base are real and will require significant effort to address. Has the US said it won’t sell submarines to Australia if it doesn’t get there? No.
Is AUKUS dangerous?
yes. AUKUS is the most complex defense project in Australian history. There are risks to US and UK industrial bases, workforce growth, infrastructure and financing. Anyone who claims otherwise is out of touch with reality.
But much has been achieved in less than five years. Australia has created one submarine base near Perthinvolved personnel in the US and UK submarine programs, began major infrastructure works, trained hundreds of personnel, and secured US Congressional approval for submarine transfers.
In the last Meeting of Ministers of Defense of AUKUSall three countries stated that the program remained on track. Based on the evidence available today, I agree.
This is a multi-decade program. There will be changes along the way. Not every fix is proof of failure.
What happens if Australia leaves AUKUS?
Australia cannot simply walk away from AUKUS and pick another submarine off the shelf. Any alternative would require a new acquisition process, a new agreement and years of negotiations.
There is also no obvious replacement. French nuclear-powered submarines, for example, are built through a single shipyard and can take more than a decade to finish.
If Australia were to abandon a second submarine program in just over a decade, this time with our closest ally, it would be hard to imagine another country joining Australia on a future submarine project.
after canceling the French submarine program and significantly reducing other marine programsour reputation for deliveries in this area is already under pressure.
AUKUS should continue to be reviewed. But this consideration must be anchored in facts. Any proposal to abandon it must also explain what replaces it and how Australia avoids a submarine capability gap.
Having spoken to officials in our partner countries, the most frequently raised concern is not the US or UK industrial base. It is Australian political will. As a nation, we must be aware of this and moderate in our debate.
Jennifer Parker is assistant professor, Institute of Defense and Security, University of Western Australia; UNSW Sydney
This article was reprinted from Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read on original article.
