Bangladesh’s potential purchase of JF-17s is turning the routine purchase of fighter jets into a dangerous new flashpoint in the escalating India-China-Pakistan power struggle.
This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that Bangladesh could increase security tensions with India by purchasing the jointly developed China-Pakistan JF-17 Thunder Block III fighter.
Those concerns were sparked after Pakistani media reported that the country has transferred a fully operational JF-17 flight simulator to Bangladesh, a move experts described as a strong indication that Bangladesh is preparing to buy the aircraft.
Developed by the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex and China’s Chengdu Aircraft Corporation, the JF-17 is seen as a cost-effective multi-role fighter equipped with beyond-visual-range missile capabilities and modern avionics, potentially allowing Bangladesh to replace its aging MiG-29 and F-7 fleets and significantly improve its air capability.
The acquisition will not overcome India’s regional air superiority, but could narrow the capability gap and complicate Indian military planning, particularly around the vital strategic Siliguri Corridor, which links India to its northeastern states.
The development comes amid strained India-Bangladesh ties following Bangladesh’s demand for the extradition of former prime minister Sheikh Hasina, who fled to India after her ouster in 2024.
Deeper Bangladesh-Pakistan defense ties could intensify Indian suspicions, trigger stronger military deployments, and increase the risks of strategic miscalculation, even if direct conflict remains unlikely.
As of May 2026, the Bangladesh Air Force has only 44 fighter jets36 of which are obsolete F-7s, while the remaining 8 are MiG-29s. This small force pales in comparison to the Indian Air Force, which, as of February 2026, it operates 29 fighter squadrons.
Assuming each squadron has 18 fighters, India could have an estimated frontline fleet of 522 fighter jets, including Dassault Mirages, Dassault Rafales, Su-30 MKIs and HAL Tejas fighters, among other types.
Although India vastly outnumbers Bangladesh’s air power, the latter’s potential purchase of JF-17s could enable it to patrol its airspace and maintain its air warfare capabilities — routine tasks that could become increasingly difficult as its fighter fleet ages.
The deal would further cement Bangladesh’s status as one of China’s biggest arms customers. In addition to F-7 fighters, the country operates two Type 035 Ming-class submarines, two Type 053H3 and two Type 053H2 frigates, four Type 056 corvettes and a significant number of Chinese-origin armored fighting vehicles, artillery and air defense systems.
Bangladesh’s extensive reliance on Chinese armaments could give China significant long-term influence over its defense posture and procurement decisions. Its Chinese-origin high-end systems are likely to depend on Chinese spare parts, maintenance, training and software updates, potentially deepening this support over time.
Additionally, Bangladesh’s location near the Siliguri Corridor, a 60-kilometer-long and 20-kilometer-wide strip of land that connects India’s northeastern states with the rest of the country, poses a significant strategic vulnerability for India.
A Chinese advance from the nearby disputed territories of Arunachal Pradesh could cut off India from its northeastern states and access to the Bay of Bengal.
Ashish Kumar Gupta notes in a February 2025 REPORT for the Center for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS) that Bangladesh’s potential purchase of Chinese fighter jets could alienate India by giving China strategic leverage to counter India’s regional influence.
Gupta notes that the potential purchase of JF-17 fighters by Bangladesh could deepen relations with Pakistan, strengthen China’s efforts to bring Bangladesh into its sphere of influence, and force India to secure its border with Bangladesh with greater urgency, thus requiring reallocation of military resources. He also adds that Bangladesh could be used to tie up scarce military resources during hostilities with India.
Hasina’s overthrow in 2024 also reshaped the geopolitical backdrop for Bangladesh’s potential JF-17 purchase. Byron Chong, in August 2024 ITEM for the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, notes that its foreign policy relied on close cooperation with India while balancing ties with China.
Chong notes that during her tenure, India-Bangladesh relations entered a self-proclaimed “golden age”, with Bangladesh aligning itself with India on key issues, dismantling camps used by Indian separatists, fighting radical Islamic groups and disrupting Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) network in Bangladesh.
He also notes that Hasina balanced relations with China while accommodating Indian sensitivities by scrapping the China-backed Sonadia port project and choosing India for the Teesta river project.
However, he says Hasina’s overthrow came as a result of increasingly authoritarian tendencies, crackdowns on opposition and civil society groups, and the resulting mass protests.
As noted by PK Vijayakumar in December 2025 ITEM in the peer-reviewed IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, Hasina’s ouster created strong anti-Indian and anti-Hindu sentiment in Muslim-majority Bangladesh, producing violence against the Hindu minority and posing a major setback for Indian diplomacy.
Vijayakumar mentions that after Hasina’s ouster, Bangladesh showed a clear trend of de-Indianization, terminated agreements signed during Hasina’s administration, delayed Indian-led regional initiatives and reduced dependence on India.
He adds that Bangladesh strengthened ties with Pakistan and China to protect its strategic autonomy, while India’s support for Hasina and refusal to extradite her intensified tensions.
Mohosina Mostofa notes on a July 2024 REPORT for the Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS) that post-Hasina Bangladesh faces the challenge of maintaining strategic autonomy amid mounting external pressures from competing powers seeking to draw Bangladesh into their orbit. She also notes that Bangladesh risks achieving short-term economic development at the expense of long-term strategic constraints.
However, Nihar Nayak notes in a March 2026 Commentary for the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyzes (MP-IDSA) that India views with concern changes in Bangladesh due to its shift towards a more neutral foreign policy, while China is expected to double its economic power through Belt and Road projects and infrastructure investments.
China often combines military cooperation with economic aid, including support related to Pakistan’s transfer of a JF-17 simulator to Bangladesh. He also notes that India is concerned about increased Pakistani involvement in post-Hasina Bangladesh, which could threaten India’s strategic interests in the Bay of Bengal and along its often volatile northeastern border.
If Bangladesh eventually acquires the JF-17, the deal may mean less about the planes themselves than what they symbolize: a post-Hasina strategic realignment that draws Bangladesh deeper into the growing India-China-Pakistan rivalry.
For India, the biggest risk may not be the erosion of air superiority, but the loss of political influence over a neighbor once central to its regional security architecture.
