The US-China summit ended without any tangible progress on the twin pressing security issues that divide the two superpowers: Iran and Taiwan.
some speculated that a deal was on the horizon that would swap the island with Chinese pressure on Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz. This did not materialize, but such a hypothetical agreement is not the only plausible link between these two volatile security issues.
Washington’s military campaign against Tehran, a middle power, is raising critical questions about how successful the US would be in a war against China, our only near rival.
There was also this conversation MOVED from America’s massive spending on high-tech munitions – an arsenal thought needed to defeat a hypothetical Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Like my colleague Jennifer Kavanagh has written recently in the New York Times, “The United States Finds Itself Facing Strategic Defeat by a Weaker Adversary” in Iran.
She also did smart MONITORING that the Pentagon is conducting Iran’s war similarly to what it would against China, relying heavily on air and naval power while keeping its surface fleet off its adversary’s shores by deploying large numbers of stealthy, stealthy drones and missiles.
In fact, the war in Iran has many parallels with a hypothetical conflict with China, and America’s performance so far does not inspire confidence.
Iran has proven to be a far more formidable adversary than many Washington strategists anticipated. No doubt, this misunderstanding is partly attributable to Tehran’s lack of major response to US strikes against its nuclear facilities in June 2025.
This apparent strategy of feigning weakness can be traced back to the legendary Chinese strategist Sun Tzu. So it is quite conceivable that the same phenomenon – that is, the US underestimating the strengths of a potential adversary – is at work in the Asia-Pacific.
A key point of Iran’s strategic success has been its ability to use a large number of mobile, accurate and short-range ballistic missiles. It is likely no coincidence that China built The world’s largest conventional short-range missile force two decades ago.
Tehran’s missiles are complemented by a host of drone designs, as well as satellite intelligence to guide them. And many suspect that Tehran received drone technology from China and is receiving crucial satellite targeting data from Beijing in the current conflict.
China today has one large enough advanced satellite constellation that can track all major US military platforms, including aircraft carriers, in real time.
One of the main lessons of the US-Iran war is that US bases on allied territory represent key targets and can be hit hard, with major impacts on US military effectiveness.
A variety of high-value systems, including expensive radars, early warning aircraft and aircraft refuelingwere hit on the ground by Iranian missile and drone attacks. This has troubling implications for the use of our scattered bases throughout East Asia.
True, Japan is better defended than the Gulf states, but American bases in Japan are protected not really hardened against rocket and drone attacks with concrete covers, for example. Moreover, as Iran has done, Beijing can undertake liabilities by attacking vulnerable sites of civilian infrastructure, such as power stations or ports.
A related point concerns low US ammunition stocks. Even before the Iran conflict, many American strategists BELIEVING The US did not have the weapons that would be required for a hypothetical war against China.
It is true that some key munitions, such as torpedoes, have not been used substantially against Iran. But others, notably Patriot missile interceptors and air-launched LRASM and JASSM cruise missiles, are estimated to have been severely depleted.
Another troubling parallel concerns the possibilities for blockades and counter-blockades. Many experts believe a Chinese blockade could be successful against Taiwan because the island imports most of its food and most of its energy.
A US counter-blockade would then be possible, in part because Washington lacks other low-risk options. However, unlike Iran, China has a world-leading navy that possesses not only modern destroyers and submarines, but also weapons that surpass the US. The capabilities of the navy, for example, in key domain of anti-ship cruise missiles.
However, wars are not won by better weapons alone, but by people inspired to sacrifice and even die in large numbers. At this point, the US military has been forced to surrender to such highly motivated opponents as the Viet Cong in Vietnam and, more recently, the Taliban and even the Houthis.
The “fiery balance” in the current conflict also clearly favors Iran, as the Trump administration has put Tehran in “the ground of death,” a situation where her very survival is threatened.
In a conflict in Taiwan, similar logic is likely to prevail as Taiwan is seen as a core interest by Beijing, while most Americans have LESS or has no knowledge of the self-governing island.
Therefore, common sense dictates that Washington should be extremely wary of a possible war with China. Unlike Iran, which can charitably be described as an aspiring “middle power,” China today is a true superpower, and Americans should realize this.
Beijing possesses not only advanced nuclear systems and formidable conventional forces, but also a strong economy containing DIRECTORS manufacturing base. When combined with the favorable geography and “fiery balance,” a Taiwan scenario looks truly unsustainable from the US perspective.
Some will argue that Taiwan is far more important to global security than Iran, but this is largely false reasoning. In fact, no vital US interests are at stake in the Taiwan Strait.
President Trump’s latest INTRODUCTORY NOTES for this matter, which have sent a shock wave through the foreign policy elite in Washington, suggest that he understands this. It is indeed logical for the US to try to de-escalate this most volatile powder keg, especially as it plays an increasingly weak hand.
Lyle Goldstein is director of Asia engagement at Defense Priorities. Goldstein also serves as director of the China Initiative and senior fellow at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University.
