Donald Trump and Xi Jinping are likely to discuss many issues when they meet this week in Beijing. But alongside trade, technology and the war in Iran, one topic of conversation will stand out – Taiwan’s future.
Taiwan has long been a sensitive issue in the Sino-American relations. Beijing considers the island a breakaway province that should be reunited with the mainland. The United States has long opposed such a move. However, in recent months, Trump has fueled speculation that he may be ready to reverse key aspects of US policy on the issue, giving Beijing long-sought concessions.
Trump’s potential willingness to make these moves means that Taiwan is one of the issues on which we may see the most significant policy developments at the summit. And this can happen simply through the convenient celebrity president uttering just a few simple words.
The president’s policy toward Taiwan has been inconsistent and seemingly more malleable than that of previous administrations. Advocates for Taiwan point out that his administration recently approved it the largest arms dealer in the US on the island. But at the same time, he has sown doubts about the strength of his support for Taiwan independence.
US policy towards Taiwan has traditionally been based on two principles. The first is “strategic ambiguity”, meaning that the US refuses to explicitly state whether it would actively use its military to defend Taiwan from attack by China. This policy is supposed to deter China, while also discouraging Taiwan from formally declaring its independence from Beijing.
The second principle is “A policy of China.Under this policy, the US recognizes Beijing as the legitimate government of China, while opposing any violent resolution of its dispute with Taiwan. It also maintains strong informal ties with the Taiwanese government in Taipei.
Observers are concerned that Trump could weaken these principles during his summit with Xi. For example, he might state that the US not only “does not support” Taiwan independence, but actively “opposes” it. Or he could double down on previous comments he made by indicating that whether or not Xi invades Taiwan is “depending on him”.
Trump has also explicitly stated that he will discuss future US arms sales to Taiwan with Xi during this week’s summit. This violates one of the so-called Six Insurances that the US has supported Taiwan since the 1980s, and which were approved by the US Congress in 2016.
Even securing a discussion on arms sales would be a victory for Xi, who would welcome an opportunity to ditch the Six Safeguards. He would likely then try to weaken the US commitment to the other five, which include a US commitment not to change its position on Taiwan’s sovereignty.
More specifically, if Xi succeeds in making US arms sales to Taiwan a legitimate topic of negotiation in Sino-US relations, then he can push them away in the future by offering the US concessions in other areas. For example, if Trump or a future president asks Beijing for help in resolving a conflict like the one in Iran, Beijing may demand an end to US arms sales to Taiwan as a price.
High stakes
Given Trump’s reputation as a fearsome China hawk, his stance on Taiwan may seem surprising. But it’s actually part of a long pattern.
In relations with China, Trump has probably always prioritized economic issues, while appearing less concerned about the security of America’s regional allies. He has also raised doubts about whether Taiwan is even protected. In his first term, he they reportedly told aides that “Taiwan is like two feet from China. We’re 8,000 miles away. If they invade, we can’t do a damn thing about it.”
Trump is also highly transactional and less focused on abstract principles of foreign policy than most previous presidents. He sees America’s support for allies like Taiwan as a gift it gives them, a gift that is often not worth the cost. If he can achieve a concrete victory for himself today by trading support for Taiwan tomorrow, he may be willing to do so.
All of these developments matter because they make a violent conflict between China and Taiwan, ultimately involving the US, more likely. If Trump makes concessions to Xi, it will be the latest sign that US support for Taiwan is faltering. This could be read in Beijing as permission to change the status quo by force. Although such an act could be met with delay followed by force from Washington in response, it is made more likely by Trump’s stance today.
Even worse for Trump, the summit comes at a time when American power and the wisdom of its long-term strategy are clearly being called into question in the Middle East. The US is mired in an intractable conflict and has severely damaged its deterrence capability in the Indo-Pacific by burning advanced munitions at a high rate. Trump’s personal unpopularity is also increasing at home amid the war and its economic consequences.
This weakened position makes it even more likely that Trump will want to strike a deal with Xi to help end the war in Iran or ease trade tensions to help the economy in the country. Taiwan may be the price of that – and, ultimately, peace.
Andrew Gawthorpe is a lecturer in history and international studies, Leiden University.
This article was reprinted from Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read on original article.
