For years, many Western observers believed that the Internet would inevitably weaken authoritarian regimes.
The logic seemed straightforward: once information could flow freely, state monopolies on propaganda would collapse. The Internet, in this view, would become a democratizing force.
The reality was different. Rather than being overwhelmed by the digital revolution, authoritarian governments like China and Vietnam have adapted to it with remarkable sophistication.
Instead of simply censoring information, they have learned to shape online narratives, manipulate visibility, exploit algorithms, and transform cyberspace itself into an instrument of political control.
The authoritarianism of the digital age no longer depends primarily on the silence of citizens. More and more depends on their flooding.
China’s Digital Authoritarianism LABORATORY
China pioneered what scholars now describe as “digital authoritarianism.”
Early efforts focused heavily on censorship through the Great Firewall, blocking foreign platforms and limiting access to politically sensitive information.
But Beijing gradually realized that blocking alone was insufficient in an age of social media and mobile connectivity. The Chinese model evolved from passive censorship to active narrative management.
political scientist Gary King and his colleagues estimated that the Chinese government generates hundreds of millions of social media posts each year through coordinated online commenters often referred to as the “50-cent Party.”
Contrary to popular assumptions, these campaigns are not primarily aimed at debating dissidents or refuting criticism directly. Instead, they seek to distract public attention, amplify patriotic sentiments, and overwhelm politically sensitive discussions with emotional or nationalistic content.
This represents a strategic shift: the goal is no longer simply to suppress dissenting information, but to dilute its political impact.
Equally important, Beijing has decentralized propaganda the production itself. Government agencies, local authorities, police departments and state-affiliated influencers increasingly operate as content creators on platforms such as Douyin, the Chinese version of TikTok.
Nationalist messages are interwoven into entertainment, memes, music, lifestyle videos and emotionally engaging short-form content. Propaganda no longer appears only through rigid ideological slogans or state television broadcasts. It increasingly appropriates the language, aesthetics, and rhythms of Internet culture itself.
The result is a much more adaptive and resilient form of political control. China’s deeper objective is not necessarily to prevent citizens from knowing the truth. Rather, it is to prevent citizens from knowing that others also know the truth, thereby weakening the possibility of collective action.
This dynamic reflects what political theorist Timur Kuran described as the problem of “falsification of preferences” under authoritarian systems: individuals may privately recognize social discontent while publicly remaining silent because they believe they are isolated.
Digital authoritarianism exploits this uncertainty by producing the illusion of consensus.
From police state to digital police state
Vietnam has increasingly absorbed and adapted elements of the Chinese model, modifying them for a more globally connected Internet environment.
Unlike China, Vietnam has not completely blocked major international platforms such as Facebook, YouTube and TikTok. Instead, Hanoi has pursued a strategy of selective pressure, platform cooperation, online surveillance and narrative flooding.
This hybrid approach allows the Vietnamese state to maintain access to the global digital infrastructure while simultaneously expanding internal control mechanisms.
A key feature of this adaptation is the growing role of security institutions in the governance of cyberspace. Vietnam’s “Force 47”. which is an online military-affiliated cyber unit said to include thousands of participants that represents an enhanced version of organized digital opinion management.
Alongside state-linked media networks and patriotic influencers, these forces act as decentralized instruments for the enforcement of online narratives.
This evolution reflects a broader transition from a traditional police state to what might be called a “digital police state,” where surveillance, propaganda, online nationalism, and algorithmic amplification merge into a continuous system of governance.
Hanoi has also adopted Beijing’s strategy of narrative flooding. Rather than relying solely on arrests or outright censorship, Vietnamese authorities increasingly promote campaigns focused on “positive content” and patriotic messages.
Official initiatives that encourage the use of “the beautiful to eliminate the ugly” aim to saturate social media with state-approved narratives while marginalizing critical voices.
The strategy is politically efficient. Excessive arrests generate international criticism and can create domestic sympathy for dissidents. In contrast, the mobilization of influencers, entertainment content or patriotic TikTok campaigns creates the appearance of voluntary social consensus.
The role of the state becomes less visible even as its influence expands.
Vietnam has also followed China’s regulatory trajectory. Shortly after Beijing passed its Cyber Security Law in 2017, Hanoi passed its Cyber Security Law in 2018including similar provisions regarding data localization, platform obligations and content management.
These legal frameworks provide institutional foundations for expanding digital control, while pressuring international technology companies to comply with domestic political demands.
Algorithms as governance
The effectiveness of modern digital authoritarianism lies not only in the capacity for censorship, but in understanding how social media systems work.
Authoritarian regimes increasingly recognize that algorithms reward engagement, emotional intensity, outrage, and repetition. Content that generates coordinated interaction gains visibility regardless of its informative quality.
By mobilizing networks of commentators, patriotic influencers, or state-affiliated content creators, governments can artificially reinforce preferred narratives and dominate user feeds without formally banning opposing views.
In this environment, visibility itself becomes political power. The result is a subtle but profound transformation of authoritarian governance, in which the state no longer needs to convince every citizen.
It simply needs to shape the information environment sufficiently to fragment public attention, exhaust outrage, and discourage coordinated dissent.
This model is particularly effective among younger generations, whose political perceptions are increasingly shaped by algorithmically curated short video content rather than traditional ideological education.
The digital democratic challenge
Adapting authoritarian regimes to the digital age presents a much more complex challenge than earlier theories of internet democratization predicted.
China demonstrated that authoritarian governments could survive the internet age. Vietnam demonstrates that these methods can also be adapted within globally connected digital ecosystems.
The danger is not simply censorship in its traditional form. It is the normalization of invisible influence systems embedded within entertainment culture, influencer economies, and algorithmic recommendation systems.
When propaganda no longer resembles rigid state doctrine, but instead wears the face of close influencers, viral memes, lifestyle content, and patriotic entertainment, authoritarian control becomes harder to identify and thus potentially more effective than ever.
Therefore, the future struggle between democracy and authoritarianism may depend less on access to information than on who controls the systems that determine visibility, attention, and collective perception online.
Nguyen Ngoc Nhu Quynh, also known as Mother Mushroom, is a Vietnamese writer, human rights commentator and former political prisoner based in Texas, United States. She is the founder of WEHEAR, an independent initiative focusing on Southeast Asian politics, human rights and economic transparency.
