Iran’s current turmoil could be an intelligence windfall for China. As Tehran’s security leadership is beheaded and its cyber capabilities become Israeli target, Beijing can draw operational lessons, deepen surveillance and expand its regional influence.
Moments of crisis within rival intelligence systems create rare opportunities for leverage. China has seized these opportunities before and is likely to do so again.
Iran-China intelligence relations have always been ambiguous. But in 2009, some malware with common authorship by the US and Israel damaged thousands of nuclear centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz uranium enrichment plant. Humbled by the precision of the cyber operation, Iranian authorities began compiling a list of insiders.
What followed was one of the worst counterintelligence failures in CIA history. At the time, the CIA relied on an insecure communications system intended for short-term use in hostile environments in Iran and China. After the Natanz debacle, the Ministry of State Security (China’s foreign intelligence service) began rounding up CIA informants and detaining them.
There were many RUNNING. CIA networks in Iran were swollen at the same time. The MSS had penetrated its communications system, and US authorities suspected that one intelligence service had tipped off the other. American intelligence suffered a generational setback. The collapse of both networks suggested that Beijing was not only observing Tehran’s crisis, but also profiting from it.
China’s counterintelligence capabilities today are even more formidable. Hacking campaigns like Volt Typhoon, which compromised US naval logistics centers, and Salt Typhoon’s ongoing intrusions into US telecommunications firms and even Congressional staff, illustrate the extent of Beijing’s cyber reach.
These operations are not just about espionage. They are increasingly designed to shape political and military perceptions. And now, with the Iran crisis, Beijing faces two strategic options.
The first is in operational access and covert learning. A prolonged conflict is degrading Iran’s conventional military capabilities, forcing it to rely more on cyber operations. Previously, Iran’s cyber capabilities were closely linked to the Ministry of Intelligence and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, whose senior leadership has now been assassinated.
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China’s widespread ecosystem of contract hackers, often operating at a distance from the state, can cooperate with Iranian cyber actors. It can also exploit confusion through “disguised” attacks designed to obscure who is responsible. At the same time, Israel’s preparation for Operation Epic Fury – hacking Tehran’s CCTV cameras, tapping the phones of political elites and infiltrating the popular prayer apps – will be instructive to planners in Beijing for a Taiwan emergency, whether it happens next month or next year.
The second is the political and technological impact. After the October 7 attacks, Beijing appeared to have lost diplomatic influence in the Middle East. Now, destabilizing Iran offers China the opportunity to draw Tehran and other regional partners closer to its orbit. China can provide surveillance infrastructure, digital governance tools and deeper intelligence cooperation without the military commitment that would antagonize Washington. By presenting itself as a reliable mediator and interlocutor, Beijing can expand its regional influence while maintaining strategic flexibility.
This dual track reflects China’s broader approach to great power competition. Cyber power is not only about disruption, but about shaping perceptions of reliability and stability. In a destabilized Gulf in which the U.S. has yet to provide a clear definition of victory — one that Israel may not subscribe to — such perceptions matter even more, especially for European allies exposed to regional instability and technological influence.
China has long understood that its great rivalry with the US is about trust. Competition between great powers often causes moments of weakness in rival systems. Iran’s current weakness may be such a moment, and Beijing is unlikely to let it pass.
Dr. Ahana Datta Fasel is the author of the forthcoming book Full Stack Spies: Cyber Espionage in the Age of US-China Competition. She was previously a UK government cyber leader and chief cyber officer of the Financial Times.
