Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is visiting Vietnam from May 1-3 and Australia from May 3-5with energy security, critical minerals and China’s maritime posture expected to be on the agenda.
The most important element may be a foreign policy speech she is expected to deliver in Hanoi, outlining a revised version of Japan’s Indo-Pacific strategy. But the journey is also shaped by what happened before it.
Takaichi has moved quickly since taking office in October 2025. She attended the ASEAN summit in Malaysia and APEC in South Korea within weeks of becoming prime minister, hosted Donald Trump in Tokyo and launched ship diplomacy with South Korean President Lee Jae-myung in January. or landslide victory in the election in February gave her the strongest domestic mandate of any Japanese prime minister since World War II.
Since then, the diplomatic pace has not slowed down. Japan and the Philippines signed a Purchase and Inter-Service Agreement in January, deepening a security relationship that now includes a 125% increase in funding Japan’s Official Security Assistance.
In March, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney visited Tokyo and the two sides signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership covering defence, energy, critical minerals and technology.
INDIA welcome Japan’s recent decision to lift its long-standing ban on lethal weapons exports, with both sides already coordinating the transfer of Japanese equipment used on Mogami-class ships.
The view is still wider. Tokyo is deepening its engagement with AUKUS Pillar IImaintaining the Quad, advancing tripartite defense cooperation through US-Japan-Australia TSD AND The US-Japan-Philippines frameworkand co-developing a next-generation fighter with the United Kingdom and Italy under GCAP.
of lifting the ban on the export of lethal weapons on April 21 provides the industrial foundation for this architecture, paving the way for exports of fighter jets, missiles and warships to 17 partner countries. Without it, agreement as The $6.5 billion Mogami-class frigate deal with Australia it would not be possible.
The sharpest test of Takaichi’s diplomacy came in March, when she traveled in Washington for a summit with Trump held against the backdrop of the Iran conflict. The United States had been pressuring its allies to help secure the Strait of Hormuz.
Takaichi led the meeting offering political support without making concrete naval commitments, citing constitutional limitations under Article 9. It left Washington with alliance cohesion intact but Japan’s energy weaknesses exposed.
The visits to Vietnam and Australia flow directly from this experience: if Trump’s summit was about managing an ally whose demands Japan cannot fully meet, Hanoi and Canberra are about deepening partnerships in which interests are more clearly mutual and vulnerabilities are shared.
The question of Hormuz
The Iran conflict has made energy security an immediate concern for both countries. Japan relies on Australia approx 40% of its LNG and about 60% of its coalbut the dependence goes both ways: Japan is one of Australia’s largest and most stable energy customers.
One last one East Asia Forum Analysis described both countries as existentially important to each other’s economic security. The Hormuz disruption threatens Japan’s supply and Australia’s market access.
Takaichi is expected to seek Albanian cooperation for stable energy flows and safe navigation through Strait of Hormuz. Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong traveled in Tokyo before the visit to discuss trade and energy security.
Takaichi is too is said to have brought The fuel guarantees backed by more than 200 days of Japan’s strategic fuel reserves, a signal aimed at reassuring Australian consumers – and an illustration of reciprocity, with Japan offering its reserves to stabilize a market that keeps its industry running.
Vietnam presents another dimension of the same problem. Hanoi has asked Japan for help in securing oil suppliesand Takaichi is expected to explore how Tokyo can cooperate during her summit with Prime Minister Le Minh Hung.
Critical minerals and the China factor
Japan’s long-term investment in diversifying its supply of critical minerals away from Chinese dominance is now a central feature of its relations with Australia and Vietnam.
The Japan-Australia Minerals Partnership is the most mature example. A decade of Japan’s support for Rare Earths of Lynasstarting in 2012, it has helped build the largest producer of rare earths outside of China, but it has also helped build an Australian industry that would not exist on its current scale without Japan’s patient capital.
Lynas now supplies 7,200 metric tons of neodymium and praseodymium per year under a contract that runs until 2038, with a minimum price guarantee. of Australia Iluka processing facilitybacked by $1.65 billion in government investment, adds further depth.
Vietnam’s role is longer term, but more uneven. JOGGEM established a research and technology transfer center for rare earths in Vietnam in 2012, but a Toyota Tsusho and Sojitz joint venture in Dong Pao deposits was abandoned in 2013.
Vietnam holds some of the world’s largest reserves of rare earths, but its own production and processing capacity remains limited. Closing that gap is one of the things Takaichi’s visit may seek to address.
The most significant takeaway from the Vietnam stop may be a foreign policy address in which Takaichi is expected announce a revised version of Japan”Free and open Indo-PacificThe strategy, framework Shinzo Abe proposed a decade ago.
The updated version is expected to focus on three pillars: strengthening economic foundations, pursuing growth through shared challenges and deepening security cooperation. The shift toward economic security reflects the change in the strategic environment since Abe first outlined the concept.
The choice of Hanoi as the venue is very obvious. Launching the revised strategy in a Southeast Asian capital rather than in a multilateral forum or together with an alliance partner signals that the framework is intended to address the region’s interests, not just the concerns of Japan’s treaty allies.
What to see
of annual meeting of leaders with Albanians on May 5 coincides with 50th anniversary of the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.
The language of the anniversary will affect the case, but the real test is whether the visit produces specific commitments that go beyond what exists. Australia’s own National Defense Strategy 2026 puts partnerships at the heart of its approach and calls Japan “an indispensable partner”.
PROTECTION industrial relations it’s already deep. What is still missing from the relationship is institutional architecture to rapidly coordinate when energy and mineral supply chains are disrupted.
For Vietnam, the Indo-Pacific discourse boils down to a relationship that already has considerable depth. Japan belongs to Vietnam the largest ODA donorher the third largest investor with $78.6 billion in registered capital and the largest working collaboration partner.
Both countries rose to one Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2023. The question is whether the revised framework produces new institutional mechanisms or funded initiatives that shift the partnership into areas such as critical minerals processing, where progress has so far been slow.
Takaichi arrived on duty with clear views on Japan’s strategic posture, including its position that Chinese military force against Taiwan would constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan. Those remarks caused a sharp deterioration in Japan-China relations, prompting Beijing to announce a Travel boycott and export ban on dual-use items.
The damage has not been repaired and has narrowed Japan’s ability to hedge between Washington and Beijing. The visits to Vietnam and Australia are, in part, an effort to build partnerships that can support a more confident Japan in a region where its room for maneuver with China has shrunk significantly.
Lam Duc Vu is a Vietnam-based risk analyst focused on trade and regional geopolitics
