North Korea’s missile test from its new Choe Hyon destroyer signals a shift toward a more flexible sea-based nuclear deterrent as the regime offsets submarine limitations.
This month, multiple the media points of sale reported that North Korea test-fired two strategic cruise missiles and three anti-ship missiles from its new 5,000-tonne Choe Hyon destroyer as part of operational efficiency tests, with Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un overseeing the launches from a pier alongside senior military officials.
The missiles were fired over waters off the country’s west coast, flying along predetermined trajectories for extended durations — cruise missiles for more than two hours and anti-ship missiles for about half an hour — before hitting targets with what North Korea described as “ultra-precise” accuracy.
The tests were conducted to evaluate the destroyer’s integrated weapons command system, improve crew capabilities, and validate improved navigation and anti-jamming features. North Korea’s state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) described the weapons as “strategic,” while Kim reiterated that strengthening the country’s nuclear deterrent remains a top priority.
The launches mark the first publicly launched anti-ship launch and come amid broader efforts to expand North Korea’s naval power, including plans for at least two additional destroyers and indications of a growing fleet rather than isolated platforms.
According to an April 2025 Beyond the Parallel ANALYSIS by Joseph Bermudez Jr. and others, the Choe Hyon is North Korea’s largest and most sophisticated warship. They estimate it to be about 144 meters long and built as a multi-mission destroyer.
They say it features a substantial missile architecture, including 44 vertical launch cells (VLS) for surface-to-air missiles and 30 larger cells for cruise or surface-to-surface missiles. They note that it is armed with close-in weapon systems (CIWS), electronic warfare suites, a 127-millimeter gun, and a helicopter/unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) deck.
They also state that it includes the Russian Pantsir-M air defense system and is estimated to support anti-aircraft, anti-ship, anti-submarine and ballistic missile roles, as well as potential hypersonic cruise and tactical ballistic missile strike capabilities.
Russian help is evident in the ship’s design. In a June 2025 Wall Street Journal (WSJ) videonaval analyst Mike Plunkett says building such a ship in roughly 13 months would be “impossible” without outside help, citing strong design similarities to Russia’s Grigorovich-class frigates.
The WSJ also notes that Russia may have supplied the Pantsir-M air defense system, while Plunkett suggests that Kim’s visit to Russia in 2023 functioned as a “sales pitch” for naval technology transfers.
Choe Hyon will likely serve as North Korea’s main naval platform for nuclear signaling, crisis response and sea-based strike operations.
previously, Asia Times reported on North Korea’s alleged nuclear submarine Hero Kim Ok. The program is ambitious but technically immature, raising doubts about its short-term reliability. Key challenges include mastering reactor design, acoustic quietness, and long-term sustainability.
North Korea’s Soviet-era Romeo-class submarines suffer from noise, limited endurance, command and control challenges and vulnerability to anti-submarine warfare, limiting them to coastal “bastion” operations and limiting their deterrence value. True sea-based second strike capability may be years away, reflecting a gap between strategic intent and deployable capability.
Taken together, the Choe Hyon acts as a sea-based deterrent, buying time while the North Korean submarine leg remains technically immature. At the doctrinal level, Choe Hyon highlights emerging tensions in North Korea’s nuclear command structure.
In particular, The 2022 North Korea Nuclear Forces Act states that they obey Kim Jong Un’s “monolithic” command, but also states that if the country’s nuclear command and control (NC2) is in danger of attack, a nuclear attack will be launched “automatically and immediately” – indicating a tension between highly personalized central command and pre-planned automaticity.
A US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) in August 2022 REPORT suggests that North Korea may adopt a hybrid NC2, combining centralized political control with limited delegation to improve survivability and responsiveness.
The report says Kim will retain sole launch authority over long-range strategic nuclear weapons such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), while limited delegation will apply to tactical systems deployed to frontline units.
He says this approach reduces vulnerability to single-point-of-command failure, avoids the political risks of full devolution, and supports a shift toward a regional nuclear war strategy by enabling faster, decentralized use of lower-yield weapons under specific conditions.
In practice, Kim is likely to retain sole control over intercontinental deterrence, while Choe Hyon’s cruise missiles serve as theater nuclear assets aimed at regional targets under tightly controlled but potentially preplanned launch conditions.
The DTRA report notes that submarine-based nuclear operations would require pre-mounted weapons and procedural controls, although the vulnerability may require early deployment or delegated launch conditions in a crisis.
However, the report notes that North Korean submarines may be too vulnerable for such a task and that their real value is largely psychological, complicating US and South Korean decision-making.
Strategically, the Choe Hyon can increase survivability by deploying nuclear assets at sea, but it also poses escalation risks, especially since its cruise missiles can carry nuclear or conventional warheads. The destroyer also signals closer ties with Russia, potentially reducing dependence on China while reshaping the dynamics of regional outreach.
As Choe Hyon adds limited naval power of her own, it deepens nuclear ambiguity, complicates crisis decision-making, and increases the risk of miscalculation in any future conflict.
