Former Russian President and current Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev warned in X that “the statement of the Russian Ministry of Defense should be taken literally: the list of European facilities that produce drones and other equipment is a list of possible targets for the Russian armed forces. When the attacks become a reality, it depends on what comes next. Sleep well, European partners!”
The remarks followed the publication by the defense ministry of the addresses of foreign companies producing drones for Ukraine.
In its statement, the ministry said it acted because “the European public not only needs to clearly understand the root causes of threats to their security, but also to know the addresses and locations of ‘Ukrainian’ and ‘joint’ companies that manufacture UAVs and their components for Ukraine in their own countries.”
The implication is that anti-war activists may target these facilities, similar to the previous ones arson attack on an Israeli-linked arms partner in the Czech Republic. It is also possible that Russia may seek to recruit saboteurs for this purpose.
However, by publishing the addresses of these companies and reinforcing the message through Medvedev’s comments, the authorities can also create excuses to increase security and deter potential sabotage.
That interpretation has led some observers to give more weight to Medvedev’s claim that the list represents “potential targets for the Russian armed forces,” rather than simply sabotage. The suggestion is that Russia may escalate to direct attacks.
While some of Russia’s supporters at home and abroad may favor such an escalation, it would risk a wider conflict, potentially even World War III.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, often seen as cautious by critics, is unlikely to take that step toward foreign drone suppliers, especially given his content after what has been described as “Operation Spider Web.”
That episode included a series of Western-backed Ukrainian drone strikes on elements of Russia’s nuclear triad last summer — the largest such operation to date, though not the first.
Some observers in the alternative media interpret Medvedev’s position as deputy chairman of the Security Council as evidence that he speaks directly for Putin, but this is not necessarily the case.
As illustrated by the debates between analysts such as Sergej Karaganov and Timofei Bordachev – who have proposed completely different strategies, from escalation against NATO to negotiations with the United States – there appear to be competing factions within Russia’s political community.
Medvedev and Karaganov are often characterized as hawkish, while Bordachev and Putin are seen as more moderate.
Over the course of the Ukraine conflict, more hard-line proposals have generally not been adopted, suggesting that Medvedev’s recent remarks may not translate into policy. He often makes strong statements that fail to materialize, which may be intended to instill fear in Western policymakers and the public.
Overall, the defense ministry’s release of the addresses of foreign drone companies in Europe is more likely intended to signal that Russian intelligence has infiltrated Ukrainian supply chains than to warn of imminent attacks, as Medvedev suggested.
His statements are often interpreted with caution, given the gap between his rhetoric and actual political decisions and actions under Putin.
it ITEM was first published on Andrew Korybko’s Substack and is republished here with editing for clarity, fluency, and grammar. Become a subscriber to Andrew Korybko’s newsletter here.
