China has roughly staked the US145 billion dollars in investment and construction contracts across the Middle East, while Iranian oil accounts for only 13-14% of its imports.
However, Beijing has no permanent military presence in the volatile region, with its only overseas base in Djibouti, thousands of miles away. The result is a structural mismatch at the heart of Chinese foreign policy: economic ambitions increasingly dependent on a security architecture that Beijing does not control.
Following US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran, the Strait of Hormuz – through which approximately 20% of the world’s oil and gas normally passes – was effectively closed. Iran’s blockade reduced traffic by more than 90% from normal levels, blocking more than 600 ships, including hundreds of tankers, inside the Gulf.
Tehran imposed a selective transit regime, allowing passage to ships from favored countries – including China, Russia and India – while banning ships bound for the West. This de facto blockade or new tariff regime will feature prominently in the US-Iran negotiations for a peace deal in Pakistan.
China’s approach to the Middle East rests on two pillars: economic integration and diplomatic engagement.
On the economic side, Arab and Gulf states received approx 39 billion dollars in Chinese investment in 2024 alone. Chinese firms now operate ports, industrial estates and energy infrastructure across the region, including local economies within Chinese trade networks.
In Oman, the China-Oman Industrial Park in Duqm represents more than 10 billion dollars in planned development; Chinese firms have also invested in refining and power upgrades infrastructure in Iran.
Alongside this economic expansion, China has sought to increase its diplomatic influence by positioning itself as a mediator in regional disputes – most notably by facilitating approach 2023 between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Together, these two pillars have allowed China to expand its regional influence without direct confrontation. But they leave a critical gap. Missing from the strategy is a security component, long supplied by the United States through a network of military bases across the region and the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet, which, until the Iran war, secured maritime trade routes in the Persian Gulf.
Although this system primarily serves American interests, it also protects the sea lanes and energy flows on which China increasingly depends – embedding Beijing ever deeper in a security environment whose foundations it does not control.
For Beijing, the Iran crisis has provided a stark demonstration of its structural exposure. Chinese-flagged ships were among those granted conditional passage – a concession from Tehran, not a guarantee – but the disruption to energy markets was severe regardless.
Some European and Asian refiners were paying nearly $150 a barrel for some crude, while the head of the International Energy Agency described the Iran blockade as more significant than the 1973, 1979 and 2022 blackouts. combined.
China’s access to the strait depended entirely on Iranian goodwill and its diplomatic standing in Tehran — exactly the kind of fragile, contingent arrangement that underscores how far Beijing’s security capacity remains behind its economic exposure in the region.
The US is much less dependent on Middle Eastern crude oil than China, relying heavily on domestic production and imports from Canada and Mexico. China, on the other hand, is the world’s largest importer of crude oil and is highly dependent on maritime supply routes.
As US dependence on Gulf energy declines, Washington’s strategic incentives may not always align with Beijing’s growing need for regional stability.
Recent developments around Iran illustrate the divergence: the United States’ interest in stability tends to extend only as far as keeping energy flowing, while China’s broader exposure to infrastructure, supply chains, and investment makes it more vulnerable to broader disruptions.
Beijing is thus increasingly exposed to a system it neither controls nor can depend on with certainty. The dilemma is clear: continue to rely on external reassurance, or take a more direct role in protecting Chinese interests.
This choice is limited by China’s own doctrine. A Chinese of 2019 white paper describes the country’s approach as an “independent foreign policy of peace”, reflecting a deep resistance to formal military alliances.
President Xi Jinping has consistently emphasized strategic autonomy and self-reliance, and China’s Global Security Initiative explicitly criticizes military alliances and what it calls a “Cold War mentality.”
These limitations are not only doctrinal, but also reputational. Beijing has framed its rise around peaceful development and non-intervention; a more assertive security role in the Middle East would risk undermining that positioning and complicating relations with host states.
Even if Beijing were willing to recalibrate, expanding a sustained military presence would likely be politically difficult. The region is extremely sensitive to foreign bases and outside interference – a limitation that is reflected in the analysis of China’s limited and cautious overseas-based record to date.
Together, these factors significantly narrow Beijing’s ability to translate economic influence into a relevant security role. As China’s overseas footprint expands and American engagements become less predictable, the costs of this deal are likely to intensify, increasing pressure on Beijing to reassess its approach.
Beijing is not currently signaling a strategic shift, but escalating risks to its overseas interests may force some adjustments. Any response is likely to take one of two forms: modest naval expansion or greater reliance on host-state security arrangements.
Since 2008, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has maintained continuous anti-piracy deployments in the Gulf of Aden, conducting more than 1600 escort missions for thousands of ships. Extending such patrols to the Arabian Sea or the Strait of Hormuz would allow China to play a more active role in securing key sea lanes.
However, this approach remains limited in scope: counter-piracy operations can protect commercial shipping, but do not achieve much of what is required to secure infrastructure or manage interstate conflict. This limitation suggests that more extensive approaches may eventually be required.
Expanding the model would require a larger logistical footprint. Sustained operations deeper in the Persian Gulf would require additional basing agreements and host country support – yet even China’s existing base in Djibouti has created friction with the US, underscoring the political sensitivity of any further expansion of its military presence overseas.
However, a limited increase in naval presence could exert a modest deterrent effect, raising the political costs of attacks on Chinese ships and creating a tight “tripwire” dynamic in which escalation risks direct confrontation. Any expansion is therefore likely to remain incremental and insufficient to address the broader risks.
The naval presence, in any case, does little to protect Chinese infrastructure located inland. This limitation points towards the second approach: strengthening the host state’s security arrangements. China has already followed this model in Pakistan, where a dedicated force of around 15,000 troops was established to protect Chinese personnel and projects along China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
Host state forces can help secure specific projects and contain non-state threats, but they are much less effective against large-scale interstate conflict or regime instability. However, such agreements allow China to reduce exposure at relatively low cost while remaining consistent with its doctrine of non-intervention.
Together, these approaches reflect a strategy of managing risk rather than solving it. China will likely continue to expand its economic presence by relying on additional security measures—limiting exposure without assuming the broader responsibilities of a full security role.
The gap between China’s economic exposure and its security capacity is likely to widen. With approx 70% of its oil imports passing through vulnerable chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz, and hundreds of billions of dollars committed to infrastructure and energy projects across the Middle East, Beijing’s exposure is both deep and growing.
No rising power has sustained global economic expansion without ultimately assuming the security responsibilities that accompany it—and China is unlikely to be the first.
Zander Dumas is a master’s student in international relations and politics at SOAS, University of London, and is interning at a media outlet based in South Korea.
