Cheng Li-wun, head of Taiwan’s main opposition Kuomintang (KMT), plans to visit mainland China from April 7-12.
Cross-strait dialogue is essential to managing tensions, which have risen significantly over the past decade, and the KMT has long played an important role in maintaining these channels. But the timing and circumstances surrounding this trip expose Cheng and the party she leads to political risks that will be difficult to navigate.
Cheng’s visit follows a precedent of KMT leaders traveling to mainland China, beginning with Lien Chan’s breakthrough meeting in 2005 with the then Chinese leader Hu Jintao. Several later KMT leaders made similar trips.
Although Cheng’s immediate predecessor, Eric Chu Li-luan, refrained from visiting during his most recent term, which ran from 2021 to last November, he are sent frequently Vice President Andrew Hsia on the mainland.
Chu also personally visited Beijing to meet with Xi Jinping in 2015, during a previous stint as chairman. That meeting helped pave the way for one unprecedented summit between Xi and then-Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou later that year in Singapore.
But public opinion has changed dramatically since 2015. The last KMT chairwoman to visit mainland China was Hung Hsiu-chu, in 2016, and her visit was severely criticized in Taiwan.
The most recent visits from Taiwanese politicians AND former president Ma have drawn harsh criticism on the island. The United States, Taiwan’s main security partner, which once encouraged cross-strait dialogue, has also become more skeptical of such an extension.
With official dialogue between Taipei and Beijing largely frozen, the KMT’s role as an informal mediator may be more important than ever. Cheng’s wish for her promote “peace and reconciliation” it is commendable. But by going to mainland China, she could lead her party straight into a political minefield.
First, from the perspective of optics, she should have visited the US before mainland China. She reportedly plans to visit Washington this year, but the sequence of those trips matters.
For the leader of a major political party to visit Beijing before Washington creates the impression that the party prioritizes its relationship with China over its relationship with the US. That’s almost certainly not the message Cheng intends to convey, but that’s how her trip to Taiwan and Washington will be perceived.
Furthermore, Cheng’s visit will come just a month before US President Donald Trump meets with Xi in Beijing. This timing may be random, but it is fears that her hosts will try to force her to make statements that Xi can use to push Trump to adjust elements of US Taiwan policy in ways that favor Beijing.
While this risk is not contingent on her visiting the mainland, any remarks she makes during her trip that seem to echo Beijing’s narratives will be even harder for Cheng and the KMT to live down. If Xi talks Trump into adopting a position that further erodes Taiwan’s international profile, Cheng’s critics will place some of the blame on her.
Even if Cheng doesn’t make any big mistakes, the optics of this trip will test her party. Her desire to engage Beijing is controversial even within the KMT. Some see an opportunity for her to help stabilization of cross-strait relations just as Lien Chan did during the administration of openly pro-independence President Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008).
If Cheng achieves similar results, she could become a transformational leader capable of uniting the party and leading it to electoral victory.
Others, however, worry that she is hurting the party appearing very close to Beijing. They also support dialogue, but are more skeptical of the Chinese Communist Party’s willingness to engage in good faith. They fear that Cheng’s approach to this engagement will deepen public distrust of the KMT and hamper the party’s chances in future elections.
The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has long portrayed the KMT as “pro-Beijing,” and most of the Taiwanese and international press echo this view. Many within the KMT have worked for years to counter this narrative. Cheng risks undermining this progress if she and the party do not convincingly demonstrate that their efforts to engage Beijing will not come at the expense of Taiwan’s security.
That said, Cheng is saying some of the right things. it insist its deployment to Beijing is part of a strategy that also includes maintaining strong containment. But when it comes to deterrence, critics — and much of the public — don’t see action matching the rhetoric.
One way the KMT could prevent and mitigate the negative narratives surrounding Cheng’s trip would be by ending the legislative deadlock on Special defense budget 40 billion dollars that President Lai Ching-te proposed last November.
Already political opponents accuse the party of stagnation and budget cuts on behalf of Beijing. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council has claimed that one of Xi’s objectives in Cheng’s invitation to China it means “to cut off Taiwan’s military procurement by the United States.”
Unless the KMT-controlled Yuan Legislature passes at least a large portion of the requested funding in the coming weeks, it will be difficult for the party to counter these narratives. Many in the KMT – including Taichung Mayor Lu Shiou-yen, who is widely seen as the party’s front-runner for the 2028 presidential nomination – are publicly calling for a significantly larger budget than the 12 billion US dollars presented by the KMT group.
Ultimately, Cheng will have to decide how to balance her ambitious agenda with the KMT’s challenges on the public front. Many, including her own party, are concerned about her trip to mainland China. It will be up to her to prove them wrong.
Michael Cunningham is a senior fellow with the China Program at the Stimson Center.
