War, we are regularly reminded, is chaos. However, the same people who remind us of this are also keen to tell us how events will unfold. The lack of information from Iran, a country the size of Western Europe locked under an internet blackout for the better part of two months, has not stopped a host of pundits and commentators, many of whom have barely lifted a finger to understand the nation’s history and culture, from making judgments with alarming clarity. It is hard not to conclude that the certainty expressed is inversely proportional to the knowledge possessed.
The much-touted “history lessons” are certainly not Iranian history lessons. We are warned to learn the lessons of Iraq, Afghanistan and occasionally Libya. When pundits dare to comment on Iran in particular, it is often misinformed and or simply inaccurate. Iranian politics has not always been held together by “force”, it is not in imminent danger of “Balkanization”, and the country’s name was not changed to Iran from Persia in 1934 – Iran has long been the country’s indigenous name.
Nor does it make much sense to draw analogies with the Iran-Iraq War without recognizing the extraordinary changes that have occurred in the past 40 years. Among the biggest mistakes has been to suggest that the Islamic Republic was on the verge of a “liberal turn” before the war began, or that we were on the verge of a deal before the attack. Iran in 1980, at the height of the revolution, was a very different polity from what we find today. History is not static and if there is a lesson to be learned, it is that developments are contextual and contingent.
Political “science” slips too easily into political astrology, with comments so general as to be meaningless. Iran, or Iranians (few bother to distinguish between the state and the wider society), are “proud”, “resolute”, “resilient” and on occasion very fond of “martyrdom”. They are at various times “pragmatic”, “ideological”, “rational” and “irrational”, determined to survive and suicidal, all depending on the argument. They are both great strategists and reckless gamblers, both cunning (a very old trope) and anarchic (another old trope), though current analysis seems to favor the former over the latter. Iranians are sophisticated, educated, rebellious and subdued, although wider society has recently faded from view as the state, the leadership of the Islamic Republic, has taken center stage.
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Indeed, a depressing development has been the growing fear and admiration of the state. With it, the aspirations, demands and sufferings of the people have disappeared, if not disappeared from the discussion. Because information coming out of Iran is controlled, the Islamic Republic enjoys an asymmetric advantage in the narrative war. It can suppress information about the damage it takes while dealing damage to it causes it’s open for all to see (and report). These manipulations are aided by the Western media’s association with the weak and hatred of Trump. A good recent example was the regime’s missile attack on Diego Garcia on March 21, which was more performance than real. The strategy of the Islamic Republic has captured the imagination. But it is far from clear whether it is as coherent (or as “crafty” as a project – or that it will deliver the results it seeks.
A generation of analysts has grown up and made a career out of the continued existence of the Islamic Republic. They are apparently struggling with the idea that it could be nearing the end of the game. They argue, despite all evidence to the contrary, not least the state of the political economy before the war, that the Islamic Republic will not only survive this war, but that it will thrive in it. So vocal has this view become that an attentive Iranian leadership has incorporated it into its own ambitions for the future. Far from mere survival, it now demands reparations and a permanent seat on the Security Council among the suggested peace terms.
The Iranian people are missing from each of these analyses. Obscured by the prolonged internet blackout, they have been silenced by their own government and by those abroad who find their positions inadequate to the arguments they seek to make. That many are conflicted by the fate of their country should be clear, but the fact that they also hate the regime and “want the job done” is worrying for many commentators in the West. If the Iranians have not been fully redeemed, they certainly have been.
If any good is to come from the catastrophe and chaos of war, it will come from the people, not the state, from the very hidden part of the equation. We must turn to the patriotism of the people and not the nationalism of the state. Political systems, as Iranians like to remind anyone who might listen, come and go. Their societies and cultures remain. If there is any stability to be found – and hope for the future – look for it here.
(Further reading: “I don’t think the United States will fight for Taiwan because I don’t think it can”)
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