China’s ambassador to ASEAN recently suggested that the current global energy shock caused by the war in the Middle East should be seen not only as a crisis, but as an opportunity to deepen cooperation on the transition to clean energy.
This framework may sound diplomatic. In reality, it is strategic – and increasingly difficult to counter. The rift in the Strait of Hormuz has once again revealed a fundamental truth about the global economy: it operates on a fragile foundation.
Approximately 20% of the world’s oil transported by sea passes through this narrow corridor, most of it destined for Asia. When conflict chokes the artery, the consequences are immediately felt in supply shocks, price spikes and political instability that ripples far beyond the Middle East.
Across Asia, governments are melee to save fuel, stabilize prices and protect their economies from cascading effects. Some, like the Philippines, have already declared energy emergencies. Others, including Indonesia, have so far maintained stability – but only within a system that remains deeply exposed to external shocks.
The crisis is fundamentally structural. Asia’s economic growth has been powered by imported fossil fuels, much of it flowing through vulnerable marine chokepoints.
This dependence is now colliding with geopolitical reality. As a final analysis pointed outthe region’s reliance on imported energy is no longer just an economic risk, but a strategic liability that threatens long-term stability.
In this context, China’s position stands out. Beijing is hardly immune to the crisis. She still highly supported for Middle Eastern oil, with roughly half of its crude imports tied to the region.
But years of preparation — from building large strategic reserves to investing aggressively in renewable energy — have given it a degree of resilience that many of its neighbors lack. Even as global markets falter, China is better buffered against prolonged disruption than most major economies.
More importantly, China has spent the last decade reshaping its energy system. Renewable energy now accounts for more than half of its electricity capacity, reflecting a deliberate shift towards electrification and indigenous energy sources. That transition, once framed primarily as a climate policy, is now emerging as a geopolitical strategy.
The less dependent a country is on oil shipments through contested waters, the more secure it becomes. This is where Indonesia enters history.
Indonesia is not yet in crisis. Officials say fuel supplies remain stable, even as pressures increase. But like much of Southeast Asia, the country remains wedded to a fossil-fuel-heavy system that leaves it vulnerable to the kind of disruption now unfolding.
The fact that stability has held – for now – should not obscure how quickly it could unravel. At the same time, Indonesia has one of the most compelling untapped advantages in the region: renewable potential. Solar, hydropower and geothermal resources are abundant. What has been lacking is not capacity, but commitment.
Thus, China’s overture comes at a key moment. Beijing has made her will clear to work with Southeast Asia on the energy transition – from renewable generation to grid development and, most importantly, energy storage, which remains one of the central challenges of clean energy systems.
These are exactly the technologies needed to turn intermittent renewables into sustainable energy on an industrial scale. For Indonesia, a partnership with China offers a way to move faster and at a lower cost.
Chinese firms dominate global supply chains for solar panels and batteries, and they bring financing and technical expertise. At a time when energy prices are rising and fiscal space is tightening, this combination is hard to ignore.
However, opportunity comes with complexity. Deeper integration with China’s energy ecosystem raises questions about dependency and strategic balance. Infrastructure, once built, shapes relationships for decades.
For Indonesia, the challenge is not simply to accept investment, but to shape it – ensuring that cooperation strengthens domestic capacity rather than replacing it.
This balance is achievable. It requires clear policy, diverse partnerships and a focus on long-term sustainability rather than short-term relief. The alternative – clinging to fossil fuel dependence and hoping for stability in remote regions – is far more dangerous.
The Strait of Hormuz crisis must be understood as more than a temporary disruption. It’s a preview of a future in which energy security and geopolitics are increasingly intertwined, and where reliance on imported fuels brings rising costs.
China is already beginning to adapt to that future, driven by both necessity and ambition. Indonesia now faces a similar choice, under far less forgiving circumstances. The ambassador’s argument, stripped of its diplomatic language, is simple: crises can accelerate change. For China and Indonesia, it can and should.
Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat is director of the China-Indonesia Desk at the Jakarta-based Center for Economic and Legal Studies (CELIOS) independent research institute.
