AI may not create a new type of terrorism, but it does make existing tactics cheaper, faster, and easier. This is the central argument of a July 2026 report from the US-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.
It’s a compelling argument, but it leaves one question unanswered: Are different terrorist groups thinking about technology the same way?
Like one terrorism expert who studies how militant groups think and adapt, I have analyzed propaganda, manuals and strategic writings from the two most influential jihadist movements of the 21st century – al-Qaeda and the Islamic State group – to observe how they interpret and adopt new technologies, such as AI. I also examined the documented uses of AI by their affiliates, media and supporters.
I found that collaborators, media and supporters in both movements use AI for propaganda, recruitment, security and planning. But al-Qaida and Islamic State-affiliated networks approach AI in ways that mirror how each movement fights. Al-Qaeda is more intentional AND think in decades. The Islamic State moves FAST and asks immediate effect.
in short, each group’s approach reflects her orGAnizAtionAl culture and reveals a different view of time and war. The Islamic State built its project around a caliphate to hold and display now – and this urgency rewards anyone who produces one. visible effect today. al-Qaida build her project about a generational war of irritation, betting that willpower and stamina can last a technologically superior enemy.
The Islamic State’s AI approach
The Islamic State has been around for a long time more aggressive media innovator of both movements.
At the height of the self-proclaimed caliphate in Syria and Iraq, she built a sophisticated media apparatus prioritizing speed, spectacle and professional production. This instinct has entered the age of AI, aided by younger, digitally immersed supporters and recruits who readily experiment with new tools.
As of 2023, supporters and members of the Islamic State have produced a rising river of AI-generated content. After the March 2024 attack on the Moscow concert hall that killed more than 130 people, supporters circulated a newsletter celebrating the killings.
Presented a false, generated by AI An Arabic-speaking anchor, who framed the attack as part of the group’s wider war against its enemies.
Networks linked to the Islamic State have also used AI to generate images, speed up translation and produce multilingual propaganda.
In June 2025, the Islamic State group’s branch in Afghanistan, the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISIS-K), published an issue of its English-language magazine, Voice of Khorasan.
Published by the al-Azaim Foundation, it adapted to AI literacy as an individual religious duty for every Muslim. This put AI literacy in the same legal category that jihadist ideologues often apply defensive jihad – a duty to fight when Muslims, their faith or their territory are attacked.
The article throws AI as a force that already shapes war, business and identity. It also warns of deep counterfeiting, surveillance and data collection, providing practical guidance on protecting yourself.
FOUNDATION later retracted religious label, it said after derision from other jihadist groups, but left the guidance in place. This suggests a fast model adoption followed by doctrinal correction.
Taken with a broader Islamic State-related experiment, the episode demonstrates a logic of mobilization where followers are taught that ignorance leaves them vulnerable to adversaries who already use technology.
In the material I reviewed, the key question is not whether AI changes the nature of war, but how to use it, defend against it, and avoid stagnation.
Al-Qaeda is also experimenting
Al-Qaeda affiliates and supporters are also experimenting with emerging technology.
The pro-al-Qaeda media was potential AI-generated images circulate as early as 2023, and its networks have promoted chatbot workshops and tutorials. In 2024, linked to Al-Qaeda Al-Malahem Electronic Army published a guide titled “Amazing Ways to Use Chatbots with AI,” offering backers tips on using the technology.
In July 2025, the United Nations announced that al-Shabaab, the Somali branch of al-Qaeda, used AI tools to translate its messages into several languages.
In May 2026, India’s National Investigation Agency laid charges over a November 2025 car bomb attack in Delhi that killed 11 people.
investigator it is claimed that the cell responsible was linked to al-Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent and hired an engineer who used YouTube and ChatGPT to research explosives.
Separately, some analysts have suggested that recent adaptations of drones by al-Qaeda’s branch in West Africa may include open-source AI tools, although the evidence remains indirect.
Militants linked to Al-Qaeda have warned that deepfakes can infiltrate or manipulate their online discussions. Al-Qaeda-affiliated social media channels have also debated the use of AI for religious research. Some posts argued that relying on it showed ignorance and poor religious knowledge.
The changing nature of war
Therefore, both movements teach supporters how to use these tools and guard against them. But parts of the pro-al-Qaeda media ecosystem ask a different question. Does technology change the nature of war itself?
The clearest example is the pro-al-Qaeda foundation Anaziat. In six consecutive parts of its Fiqh al-Harb, or “Jurisprudence of War,” series in 2025, the foundation published Arabic translations of Western strategic writings on AI, cyber warfare and technological change.
One text examines AI and the future of warfare. Another asks whether strategists should take AI philosophy seriously. Two others debate whether AI can change the nature of war. The series then criticizes cyber warfare and the assumption that technological superiority can overcome the enduring realities of conflict.
Read together, the texts organize a revealing debate that returns repeatedly to human agency, consciousness, political purpose, resilience, and will. The series does not reach a verdict against AI. Rather, its importance lies in the questions it chooses to ask and the assumptions it repeatedly tests.
Different organizational cultures
These approaches reflect different orGAnizAtionAl instincts. Al-Qaeda has historically it has been more patient AND intentionalframing her struggle as a long struggle and carefully vetting her messages.
Its strategy relies on a bet that political will and stamina can overcome technological superiority. of the movement survived the rise of drones, mass surveillance and precision strikes being dispersedabsorbing the losses, adapting and waiting.
Anaziat’s editorial choices stand out because they echo these assumptions. His series is aimed at Western researchers who question whether machines and AI can replace human judgment and overcome the uncertainty of war, and whether superior weaponry can replace resilience, political intent and human will.
The series uses Western military writing to test al-Qaeda’s long-war strategy and repeatedly returns to the same proposition: Technology can change the way wars are fought without deciding who endures or who ultimately wins.
Al-Qaeda believes that resilience, political will and human agency favor it. Military or technological superiority, according to him, does not guarantee victory.
Both movements use AI for many of the same practical purposes. The difference lies in how they understand the technology and the questions they ask beyond immediate use. The discourse associated with the Islamic State treats AI primarily as a means of mastering the now.
Parts of the pro-al-Qaeda ecosystem do, too, but they also situate it within a longer debate about war, sustainability, and strategic victory. These organizational cultures can shape not only the AI tools each movement chooses next, but what it uses them for—and how.
Sarah Harmouch is a researcher in the fight against terrorism, George Washington University
This article was reprinted from Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read on original article.
