To say that former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina left office in disgrace would be an understatement by any political measure.
Deposed after the student-led uprising of August 2024, it fled the country after months of deadly protests and years of increasingly authoritarian rule marked by enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, repression of political opponents and severe restrictions on civil liberties.
For many Bangladeshis, especially the generation that led the protests, her downfall represented the rejection of an entire political system built on fear, patronage and impunity.
So when Hasina announced in July 10 that she intended to return to Bangladesh in December this year along with senior Awami League leaders, the real story was not simply whether she would return.
So was a former prime minister faces a death sentence and the subject of a formal extradition request from Bangladesh remains able to organize political activity from Indian territory.
Since Hasina’s ouster, the Awami League has been banned from political activitywhile the International Criminal Court of Bangladesh has convicted him in absentia and sentenced him to death.
Dhaka has officially requested her extradition from India, a request New Delhi has accepted but says remains under legal review.
However, despite these developments, Hasina has continued to issue political statements, address supporters and announce plans for her return from Indian soil. This raises questions not only about her political ambitions, but also about India’s role as her host.
No country can be blamed for harboring a foreign political leader. Granting asylum, however, is fundamentally different from allowing a former head of government facing serious criminal penalties to organize political activity while remaining outside the reach of her country’s justice system. Legal experts insist the distinction is important.
Former special counsel to the chief prosecutor at Bangladesh’s International Criminal Court, Toby Cadman, who was directly involved in efforts to bring Hasina to justice, believes India has failed to meet its legal obligations.
In an interview, he told the correspondent: “I have repeatedly called on India to respect the extradition treaty and hand over Sheikh Hasina to Bangladesh to face trial. India repeatedly ignored all calls. In my opinion, there was no basis to refuse on any of the grounds mentioned in the treaty, but as a result of the failure, she was tried in absentia.”
Bangladesh’s political future should be shaped by its institutions, laws and citizens, not by insidious political campaigns orchestrated from exile under the protection of a neighboring state, he said.
That Hasina has chosen December for her comeback is surely not a coincidence. Rather, it is a carefully calculated political move. December, after all, is the month in which Bangladesh commemorates its victory in The war of 1971 against India’s arch-rival Pakistan, the foundational event around which the Awami League has built much of its political identity.
For decades, the party has portrayed itself as the main guardian of Bangladesh’s independence and the defender of the nation’s founding ideals. A comeback during this period is therefore a deliberate and cynical attempt to exploit the patriotism and emotional resonance associated with the birth of the country.
Koha aims to reframe Hasina’s return not as the homecoming of an authoritarian ruler accused of grave abuses, but as the return of the party leader who led Bangladesh’s struggle for independence.
It would also provide an opportunity to portray the legal proceedings against her not as a matter of criminal responsibility but as an attack on the legacy of the war itself.
If Hasina were to voluntarily submit to arrest or imprisonment upon her return, her supporters would surely seek to cast her as a political martyr for the cause she claims to represent.
The December announcement also works as a form of psychological pressure. Months before Hasina sets foot in Bangladesh, if she does at all, the BNP government must contend with heightened security, possible street mobilization and counter-protests.
The announcement forces Dhaka to expend political attention and state resources on a confrontation that may never materialize.
Ali Riaz, distinguished professor of political science at Illinois State University and former special assistant to former chief adviser Muhammad Yunus, believes the timing is a “well-designed political ruse.”
“By announcing her return six months in advance, Hasina is trying to ensure that the political conversation in Bangladesh is dominated by her, her party and her return,” Riaz said.
After Hasina’s announcement, Bangladesh’s chief prosecutor, Mohammad Tajul Islam, reiterated that she would be arrested immediately upon entering Bangladesh to face the charges against her. declaring: “Whether you come in December or January is your decision, but we want you tomorrow.”
For years, Hasina’s government was widely regarded as New Delhi’s closest strategic partner in Dhaka. Bilateral cooperation expanded across security, counter-terrorism, connectivity and trade, giving India an unprecedented level of influence in Bangladesh.
Her departure inevitably changed this equation. The new government has made it clear that relations with all major powers, including India, should be based on mutual respect and sovereign equality rather than political dependence.
India’s continued protection of Hasina is not just a matter of law. It is a geopolitical issue with serious implications for Bangladesh’s sovereignty and the future of one of South Asia’s most important bilateral relations.
India has consistently held that of Bangladesh the extradition request remains under legal review. This is, of course, the sovereign right of New Delhi. But sovereignty cuts both ways.
Bangladesh is equally entitled to expect that its request will be considered in good faith and that Indian territory will not become a platform from which a former leader facing punishment can continue to influence the country’s domestic politics.
While there may not yet be publicly available evidence that New Delhi is orchestrating Hasina’s return, India’s decision to continue harboring her while she mobilizes a political party banned from Indian soil inevitably gives New Delhi political leverage over the BNP government.
Whether this leverage is actively used or simply held in reserve, its existence complicates Dhaka’s efforts to pursue a “Bangladesh firstForeign policy and re-evaluation of transit, economic and strategic agreements inherited from the Hasina era.
“Unless there is a green signal from the Indian government that it is prepared to hand her over, this whole talk of Hasina’s return is a political ploy to create instability within Bangladesh,” Riaz said.
Bangladesh has changed radically since 2024. The movement that forced Hasina out of office was not led by a single rival political party. It was led by a generation of Bangladeshi youth demanding accountability, democratic reform and an end to authoritarian rule.
Any attempt to revive the political order they ousted is likely to meet resistance from large sections of Bangladeshi society itself. According to Riaz, New Delhi is “misjudging Bangladesh”.
“Bangladesh has changed,” he says. “It is not just that a new government has come to power; the 2024 uprising and what followed has changed the way the people of Bangladesh see their relationship with India. If India does not recalibrate its policy, it is making a serious mistake once again.”
Hasina’s announcement has already re-ignited political tensions months before any return was due. But the bigger question is whether India can continue to present itself as a neutral partner while simultaneously hosting, protecting and enabling the political activism of a neighboring country’s former ruler.
The future of Bangladesh must be determined in Dhaka, not in exile. As Riaz says, “The relationship with Bangladesh should be based on dignity and respect, treating Bangladesh as a neighbor and resolving outstanding issues. The perception among Bangladeshis is that India wants an unequal relationship with its neighbours, especially Bangladesh. This has to change.”
If India wants to show it respects the sovereignty of its nearest neighbour, critics in Bangladesh say it must ensure its treatment of Hasina is seen as consistent with the principles of mutual respect and non-interference that both countries publicly claim to uphold.
Otherwise, what began as an announcement by a former prime minister risks becoming a defining test of India’s credibility as a neutral and reliable partner for Bangladesh.
Simonetta Fornasiero is an award-winning Italian broadcast journalist specializing in international affairs. She has held senior editorial positions at German Radio and Television ARD and Channel News Asia.
