Originally published by Pacific Forumarticle reprinted with permission.
Most Western analyzes of the recent purge of two four-star generals of the People’s Liberation Army (上将) treat this development as something of a shock. Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping has been accused of paranoiaand the power of the Chinese Communist Party Central Military Commission (CCP CMC) is supposed to be collapsing.
Western voices tend to focus on the role of ideology within the PLA and are quick to detect signs of internal fragmentation, but the fall of these officers must be examined from the perspective of “Chinese characteristics.”
General Zhang Youxia (張又侠), first vice chairman of the CCP CMC, and General Liu Zhenli (刘振立), chief of staff of the CMC Joint Staff Department, were arrested in late January and charged with “serious violations of discipline and law”, i.e. corruption. Both were prominent PLA representatives in the National People’s Congress, and Zhang Youxia had been close to Xi Jinping since their childhood as “princesses” (太子党).
This extraordinary purge is the culmination of President Xi’s anti-corruption campaign and leaves the CMC with only two members remaining: General Zhang Shengmin (张升民), second vice chairman, and Xi Jinping himself, as chairman.
What led to this latest purge?
Since 2012, Xi has been trying to create a strong modernized military, using the slogan “fight and win,” with the goal of building a world-class military by 2049. Xi’s plan means persuading the PLA to abandon its historical and ideological privileges and instead maintain the morale and fighting spirit of the troops by developing modern and advanced strategies.
This latest purge looks different from Xi’s previous ones and may have resulted from a different set of leaders, most importantly a conflict over the principles of combat readiness required to execute a military operation in Taiwan in 2027, which includes concepts of joint operations, education, training, operations manuals and doctrines for commanders in the field.
Given his time, this conflict between Xi and Zhang may have been exacerbated by the unexpected and wildly successful US military operation Absolute Resolve, in which Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro caught on January 3.
In 2023, Xi is said to have been released an operational directive for the PLA: “If Taiwan authorities declare independence, ensure that by 2027 all preparations for combat readiness are in perfect place so that rapid military means can be applied against Taiwan.”
The date is, not coincidentally, politically crucial for Xi, who expects the 21st CCP congress in 2027 to hand him a fourth term as president. Despite this directive, however, those generals with combat experience, including Zhang Youxia, have continued to question the feasibility of the PLA achieving this capability by 2027.
However, President Xi kept General Zhang Youxia in place despite widespread speculation that he would be replaced, especially after Zhang’s protégé, Minister of National Defense Li Shangfu (李尙福), was cleared on 24 October 2023 of bribery charges.
Chinese characteristics and this latest purge
This episode should be interpreted through the lens of the distinctive “Chinese characteristics” under which the PLA is subject to civilian control: What it means for the PLA to function as a “party-army”, the competing views of whether the party (黨) or the army (軍) really “controls” the PLA, and the acute conflict of PLA capitulation and great power within the CCP. The US Armed Forces, so clearly demonstrated by Operation Absolute Resolve. Can the PLA credibly copy the structure and operational patterns of the US military, and should it?
The Chinese military is under the auspices of the PKK, and is also under civilian control. In fact, the PLA is the armed wing of the CCP, not the Chinese state. Thus, the general secretary of the PKK simultaneously serves as the chairman of the KKM, whose membership includes senior generals in office.
Xi has strengthened control of the CCP by implementing a “Chairman’s Accountability System” which consolidated his absolute, personal control over the PLA, elevating his authority over military decisions, strategic planning and personnel. This change was resisted by General Zhang Youxia, who preferred to maintain a decentralized system of collective responsibility, thereby undermining the CCP’s absolute leadership over the military and preventing the implementation of Xi’s directives.
As implied by its official name, the PLA claims to embody “people’s democracy” and should therefore be seen as serving the PKK. The PKK has always exercised strong control over party-military relations, so that the general’s position within the PKK hierarchy takes precedence over his military rank, both formally and in practice. General Zhang Youxia has questioned the party’s dominance over the military – particularly in relation to the progress of President Xi’s relentless anti-corruption campaign, which Zhang is said to have tried to moderate.
Xi is determined to hold the line that the PLA serves the CCP, and he is the primary leader of the CCP in a way not seen since Mao Zedong. Xi will allow no shift towards a Western concept of a military serving the state: Chinese characteristics are essential to his vision of the PLA, and indeed to maintaining his personal power.
What else for PLA?
This latest purge should be seen as an integral part of Xi’s long-term plans for China’s military: completing PLA reform by 2035 and building a world-class military by 2049.
His 2016 reforms marked the most significant restructuring of the Chinese military since 1949, transforming it from a defense-oriented, military-centric organization into a force structure capable of joint offensives. These reforms were intended to root out corrupt links between military regions (MRs), local politicians and state-owned defense industries, and build the ability to deny external threats, including US expeditionary forces.
The essence of this transition was replacing the seven inherited MRs with five theater commands(TC) designed to enable joint operations that integrate the Army, Navy, Air Force and Missile Forces in all combat domains: land, sea, air, space and cyber.
The next generation of PLA generals will have to secure Xi’s trust, and it is an open question how they will seek to earn his trust. some the commentators expect China to reduce its military pressure on Taiwan after purging the last generals with actual combat experience. But it is also possible that the new military leaders could intensify exercises around Taiwan to demonstrate their resolve to their commander-in-chief.
Likewise in the Yellow Sea: When General Zhang commanded the Shenyang Military Region (now replaced by the Northern Theater Command), he favored keeping the Yellow Sea, in which US forces Korea also operates, as a buffer zone. It is entirely possible that the new Northern TC commanders see this region as a test case to expand the Chinese sphere of influence.
CONCLUSION
So-called “socialism with Chinese characteristics” is central to President Xi’s vision, driving his political, economic and military approach to government. However, many observers feel that these same Chinese characteristics, particularly prioritizing political loyalty over operational competence, and centralized control over mission command, are inevitably in tension with President Xi’s efforts to transform the PLA into a world-class military.
President Xi’s effort to square the circle will depend on the appointment of senior officers to replace those recently purged, and that is expected after the CCP’s annual plenary session in the fall. How they seek to demonstrate their loyalty could have significant consequences: for Taiwan, for the Korean Peninsula, and for the wider world.
Sukjoon Yoon (sjyoon6680@kima.re.kr) is a navy captain, Republic of Korea Navy (retired) and is currently a senior fellow at the Korea Institute of Military Affairs (KIMA) and advisory committee member at the ROK Ministry of National Defense.
